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MACHINE LEARNING AND THE NEW
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Zoe Niesel*

ABSTRACT
There is an increasing emphasis in the legal academy, the media, and the
popular consciousness on how artificial intelligence and machine learning
will change the foundations of legal practice. In concert with these discussions, a critical question needs to be explored—As computer programming
learns to adjust itself without explicit human involvement, does machine
learning impact the procedural practice of law? Civil procedure, while sensitive to technology, has been slow to adapt to change. As such, this Article
will explore the impact that machine learning will have on procedural jurisprudence in two significant areas—service of process and personal
jurisdiction.
The Article will begin by assessing the impact that technological developments have had on these two foundational procedural doctrines, from interstate transportation and communication, to computers and the internet,
and to the newest era of Web 2.0 and social media platforms. The Article
will then explore machine learning and its current applications. Many of
these applications involve increased human interaction conducted by intelligent programs that have the potential to result in causes of action independent of explicit human programming.
Next, the Article will proceed to examine the impact machine learning
will have on jurisdiction and service of process in the federal courts. Specifically, the Article finds that these procedural doctrines will need to be adjusted to recognize that the major concepts about targeting and purposeful
availment will be fundamentally altered by machine learning. Service of
process will need to adjust as machine learning makes it easier to serve
defendants through the use of search algorithms, changing what it means
for notice to be reasonably calculated to reach the defendant. On the personal jurisdiction side of the house, machine learning topples concepts of
purposeful availment by allowing programs to initiate behaviors that result
in causes of action in new fora without human or corporate involvement,
thus suggesting a universal standard of personal jurisdiction might be necessary. Regardless, it seems clear that the slow-changing tides of procedure
may need to fast track their progress as technology becomes more independent and more unpredictable than ever before.
* Associate Professor of Law, St. Mary’s University School of Law.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A

S artificial intelligence and machine learning come alive, the demon awakens.1 No other technology currently in existence has
such capacity to change the fabric of society or the legal profession’s rules of order.2 It should come as no surprise that the applications
of artificial intelligence (AI) are growing in size, sophistication, and
scope.3 AI now predicts the weather,4 recommends movies to watch,5

1. The demonic introduction is inspired by Elon Musk, who stated at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Aeronautics and Astronautics department’s Centennial Symposium, “I think we should be very careful about artificial intelligence. If I were to
guess like what our biggest existential threat is, it’s probably that. . . . With artificial intelligence we are summoning the demon.” Matt McFarland, Elon Musk: ‘With Artificial Intelligence We Are Summoning the Demon.’, WASH. POST (Oct. 24, 2014, 1:37 PM), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2014/10/24/elon-musk-with-artificial-intelligence
-we-are-summoning-the-demon/?noredirect=ON&utm_term=.Bb9690cc837d [https://
perma.cc/BM3M-KCLV] (also advocating for increased regulation and oversight at the national and international level).
2. See generally Julie Sobowale, How Artificial Intelligence Is Transforming the Legal
Profession, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2016, at 46, 47–48.
3. See, e.g., Shanhong Liu, Artificial Intelligence Software Market Revenue Worldwide
2018–2025, STATISTA (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/607716/worldwideartificial-intelligence-market-revenues/ [https://perma.cc/CFB8-P64P] (“According to the
market research firm Tractica, the global artificial intelligence software market is forecast
to experience massive growth in the coming years, with revenues increasing from around
ten billion U.S. dollars in 2018 to an expected 126 billion by 2025.”).
4. See Alex Lopatka, Meteorologists Predict Better Weather Forecasting with AI, 72
PHYSICS TODAY 32 (2019), https://doi.org/10.1063/PT.3.4201 [https://perma.cc/SG3Z6RAJ] (discussing the use of machine learning to have programs recognize weather
features).
5. See Allen Yu, How Netflix Uses AI, Data Science, and Machine Learning—From A
Product Perspective, MEDIUM (Feb. 27, 2019), https://becominghuman.ai/how-netflix-usesai-and-machine-learning-a087614630fe [https://perma.cc/KW3S-5BL4] (discussing Netflix’s
use of machine learning and AI for personalization of movie recommendations, auto-generation of thumbnails, location scouting, and movie editing).
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comforts patients with anxiety,6 turns off the lights,7 drives cars,8 and diagnoses breast cancer.9 It is slowly moving into almost every corner of
national and international life.10 And this mission creep includes the legal
profession.11 Over the past five years, the legal profession has turned its
attention to the AI revolution, asking about the ethics of intelligent machines,12 how machine learning can improve legal research,13 who can be
sued when AI results in liability,14 and the concept of AI ownership.15
6. See Cami Rosso, Is the Robot Psychologist the Next Big AI App?, PSYCHOLOGY
TODAY (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-future-brain/201810/
is-the-robot-psychologist-the-next-big-ai-app [https://perma.cc/3Y9V-ARTE]
(“[A]utomated psychological services powered by AI technology may very well emerge
within the next five-to-ten years. More likely, it will initially take shape in the form of an
innovative service delivered on the mobile smartphone as tool . . . .”).
7. See Andrew Weinreich, The Future of the Smart Home: How Homes Powered by
Artificial Intelligence Will Know & Care for You, FORBES (Feb. 8, 2018, 10:39 AM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/andrewweinreich/2018/02/08/the-future-of-the-smart-home-howhomes-powered-by-artificial-intelligence-will-know-care-for-you/#40c95c859749 [https://
perma.cc/XJE3-LS7J] (explaining the possibility of AI in homes in the near future).
8. See, e.g., Kyle Wiggers, MIT’s AI Makes Autonomous Cars Drive More Like
Humans, VENTUREBEAT (May 23, 2019, 12:15 PM), https://venturebeat.com/2019/05/23/
mits-ai-makes-autonomous-cars-drive-more-like-humans/ [https://perma.cc/XJE3-LS7J]
(“[S]cientists are investigating an approach that leverages GPS-like maps and visual data to
enable autonomous cars to learn human steering patterns, and to apply the learned knowledge to complex planned routes in previously unseen environments.”).
9. See Helen Yule, Breast Cancer Diagnosis by AI Now as Good as Human Experts,
MEDICAL XPRESS (Apr. 30, 2019), https://medicalxpress.com/news/2019-04-breast-cancerdiagnosis-ai-good.html [https://perma.cc/6JFQ-C47P] (explaining how AI could be used to
speed up diagnosis and improve its accuracy).
10. See generally Steve Vosloo, The Rise of Artificial Intelligence for International Development, ICTWORKS (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.ictworks.org/artificial-intelligence-inter
national-development/ [https://perma.cc/LR5K-FZ58].
11. See generally Thomas Burri, International Law and Artificial Intelligence, 60 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 91 (2017) (focusing on different aspects of international law including
automation, personhood, weapons systems, control, and standardization).
12. See, e.g., Katherine Medianik, Artificially Intelligent Lawyers: Updating the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct in Accordance with the New Technological Era, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1497, 1499 (2018) (“[ROSS] is able to go through mounds of data in seconds,
monitors the law around the clock to notify lawyers of new court decisions that can affect
their cases, and makes the legal research process quicker and cheaper.”); Drew Simshaw,
Ethical Issues in Robo-Lawyering: The Need for Guidance on Developing and Using Artificial Intelligence in the Practice of Law, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 173, 176 (2018) (“If implemented
responsibly, AI could expand access to legal services to parts of society that have historically been shut out.”).
13. See generally Mary Ann Neary & Sherry Xin Chen, Artificial Intelligence: Legal
Research and Law Librarians, AALL SPECTRUM, May/June 2017, at 16, 17. See also DAVID
HOULIHAN, ROSS INTELLIGENCE AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN LEGAL RESEARCH 11
(2017).
14. See Jessica S. Allain, From Jeopardy! to Jaundice: The Medical Liability Implications of Dr. Watson and Other Artificial Intelligence Systems, 73 LA. L. REV. 1049, 1051
(2013) (“By combining elements from medical malpractice, vicarious liability, products liability, and enterprise liability, the law can create a uniform approach for artificial intelligence systems, thereby eliminating any inequities that may arise from courts applying
different theories of liability.”); Gabriel Hallevy, The Criminal Liability of Artificial Intelligence Entities–from Science Fiction to Legal Social Control, 4 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 171,
172 (2010) (examining the questions of imposing criminal liability on AI entities and how
punishment could be addressed).
15. See generally Robert C. Denicola, Ex Machina: Copyright Protection for Computer-Generated Works, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 251, 253 (2016). See also David Marc
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One subject has been almost suspiciously absent from the discussion—
civil procedure. While some preliminary scholarly discussion has centered
on using intelligent algorithms to find plaintiffs for class actions or to impact the process of discovery, the profession has yet to consider what
some of the fundamental doctrines in legal practice will look like as AI
continues to develop.16 While concepts of AI and liability are generally
well covered, scholars have not explored the ramifications of AI on the
very procedural system that would shepherd claims of liability.17 Further,
the U.S. regulatory system has yet to embrace a comprehensive regulatory plan despite the coming AI revolution.18
Indeed, the absence of civil procedure from the discussion is unfortunate, as some of civil procedure’s critical doctrines have been slow to advance in the face of new technologies. Personal jurisdiction and service of
process are among the crucial doctrines that have long slept in the
shadow of technological revolutions.19 Indeed, the Supreme Court has
yet to clarify how minimum contacts and the internet should coexist in
the American legal system.20 Even less thought has been given to how
Web 3.0 technologies—such as machine learning, AI, and human-computer interfacing—will force changes in the procedural jurisprudence.21
This Article is a first shot at examining how the American procedural
system will deal with AI applications. The Article focuses specifically on
machine learning—a method by which programs are trained to respond
to stimuli on their own—because machine learning applications are already impacting concepts like purposeful availment. Part II examines the
historical growth of major doctrines in service of process and personal
Rothenberg, Can Siri 10.0 Buy Your Home? The Legal and Policy Based Implications of
Artificial Intelligent Robots Owning Real Property, 11 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 439, 442
(2016).
16. See Kingsley Martin, Artificial Intelligence: How Will it Affect Legal Practice–And
When?, THOMSON REUTERS (Apr. 27, 2016), https://blogs.thomsonreuters.com/answerson/
artificial-intelligence-legal-practice/ [https://perma.cc/622Q-669G] (“A recent study by
McKinsey & Co estimates that 23% of lawyer time is automatable.”).
17. See Elizabeth Fuzaylova, War Torts, Autonomous Weapon Systems, and Liability:
Why a Limited Strict Liability Tort Regime Should Be Implemented, 40 CARDOZO L. REV.
1327, 1343 (2019) (“AI liability and regulation continue to be under-defined. However,
academics have explored legal doctrines as they apply to autonomous machines in the context of tort law, contract law, and the law of war.”).
18. Id. at 1344 (“Notably, there has been no federal agency tasked with creating regulations or assessing new AI technologies that go to market.”).
19. See Thomas J. Hall & Judith A. Archer, Personal Jurisdiction Based on Electronic
and Telephonic Communication, N.Y. L.J. (June 20, 2019, 12:00 PM), https://www.law.com/
newyorklawjournal/2019/06/20/personal-jurisdiction-based-on-electronic-and-telephoniccommunication/?slreturn=20200318110528 [https://perma.cc/7P6F-2URL] (explaining the
increase in analysis by courts examining fact patterns with more remote physical contacts);
see also Phil, What to Consider Before Serving Process via Social Media, LEGAL LANGUAGE SERVS.: LEGAL LANGUAGE BLOG (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.legallanguage.com/
legal-articles/serving-process-via-social-media/ [https://perma.cc/33E9-K9M2] (explaining
how social media service of process has been accepted by courts around the world but not
so much in the United States).
20. See, e.g., Zoe Niesel, #PersonalJurisdiction: A New Age of Internet Contacts, 94
IND. L.J. 103, 104 (2019).
21. Id. at 137–38.
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jurisdiction. Part III then examines the concept of machine learning, how
it operates, and the impact it is having on interactions that are likely to
lead to litigation. Finally, Part IV examines the “new Civil Procedure”—
one fully embracing the changes that machine learning is likely to have
on how cases are brought in the courts. Specifically, this section examines
how machine learning is likely to change the methods and processes by
which defendants are located and served with notice of suit.22 Additionally, this section examines how the personal jurisdiction concept of purposeful availment will be forever altered by programs that can act
independently of their creators and asks the ultimate question of whether
the decision to use these technologies is in itself an act of purposeful
availment. It is hoped that this discussion provides context to explain why
civil procedure must more rapidly adapt to the changing technological
landscape.
II. CIVIL PROCEDURE AND TECHNOLOGICAL GROWTH
Like all legal doctrines, civil procedure is responsive to technological
growth and change.23 Indeed, nearly every first-year law student learns
that the development of interstate transportation technology led to the
minimum contact revolution in personal jurisdiction in International Shoe
Co. v. Washington.24 However, the doctrines of civil procedure, although
sensitive to new technology, are sluggish in their adaptations.25
For example, International Shoe was decided in 1945—a time in which
the automobile and the railroads allowed increased movement of goods
between states.26 The use of railroads and automobiles also allowed cor22. See generally James Ovenden, Why the Legal Profession is Turning to Machine
Learning, INNOVATION ENTERPRISE (Jan. 25, 2016), https://channels.theinnovationenter
prise.com/articles/why-the-legal-profession-is-turning-to-machine-learning [https://
perma.cc/M8VY-BADC].
23. See generally Jeff Salling, How Changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Affect the eDiscovery Process, CDS LEGAL (July 19, 2016), https://cdslegal.com/insights/
how-changes-to-the-federal-rules-on-civil-procedure-affect-the-ediscovery-process/ [https:/
/perma.cc/AY4F-VLBS] (analyzing the amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for e-discovery).
24. 326 U.S. 310 (1945); see McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)
(identifying “modern transportation and communication” as the motivating forces responsible for the Court’s decision in International Shoe); Lindy Burris Arwood, Personal Jurisdiction: Are the Federal Rules Keeping Up with (Internet) Traffic?, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 967,
998 (2005) (noting International Shoe as the first instance of the Court “us[ing] technology
to expand boundaries beyond those of the defendant’s state”); Danielle Keats Citron, Minimum Contacts in a Borderless World: Voice over Internet Protocol and the Coming Implosion of Personal Jurisdiction Theory, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1481, 1506–07 (2006) (“The
twentieth century’s sea change in transportation and communication technologies
prompted the Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington to expand forum-court jurisdiction beyond people and property located in a state’s borders to include nonresidents
whose forum activities gave rise to the litigation.”).
25. Stephanie A. Gore, “A Rose by Any Other Name”: Judicial Use of Metaphors for
New Technologies, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 403, 446 (2003) (discussing personal
jurisdiction and noting that “advances in technology can force the paradigm to shift over
time”).
26. See Nelson v. Miller, 143 N.E.2d 673, 677 (Ill. 1957) (“The advent of the automobile and the rapid extension of its use had underscored the problem of the nonresident who
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porations, like the one in International Shoe, to conduct increased business over state lines, thus requiring the Supreme Court to abandon
traditional conceptions of personal jurisdiction based on physical presence.27 And yet, railroads had been in existence since 1828,28 when the
last surviving signer of the Declaration of Independence broke ground on
the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.29 Further, a coast-to-coast railroad was
in place by 1869.30 Automobiles were also old news—Henry Ford sold his
first Model T in 1908.31 Indeed, in 1945 the big news in transportation
technology was space rockets, not railroads.32 It had taken over 100 years
for the Court to adapt its personal jurisdiction doctrine to what was then
commonplace transportation technology.33
A similar response to technological changes is seen across multiple facets of civil procedure. Service of process and personal jurisdiction are
both subject to slow and steady growth, not rapid evolution.34 As such,
this section explores the leisurely changes that have occurred across these
areas as sluggishly stimulated by the technological landscape.
enters the State, causes injuries, and withdraws to the relative sanctuary of his residence
beyond the State’s borders.”); Michele N. Breen, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet:
“Shoehorning” Cyberspace into International Shoe, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 763, 814
(1998) (noting that, for the automobile, “International Shoe expanded and conformed to
incorporate these modern inventions”).
27. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250–51 (1958) (discussing International Shoe
and stating that “[a]s technological progress has increased the flow of commerce between
States, the need for jurisdiction over nonresidents has undergone a similar increase”).
28. Early American Railroads, U.S. HIST., http://www.ushistory.org/us/25b.asp [https://
perma.cc/6TV6-X8KU] (explaining the development of railroads).
29. Id. (noting that the last surviving signer of the Declaration of Independence was
ninety-one-year-old Charles Carroll).
30. See Andrew Glass, Transcontinental Railroad is Completed, May 10, 1869, POLITICO (May 10, 2011, 4:34 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2011/05/transcontinental-rail
road-is-completed-may-10-1869-054591 [https://perma.cc/3SR7-6JNG] (“[W]orkers for the
Union Pacific and Central Pacific railroads drove a golden spike into the rails at Promontory Summit, Utah. The event marked completion of the first transcontinental railroad,
connecting the nation from coast to coast and cutting a journey of at least four months to a
week.”).
31. See Model T Facts, FORD MEDIA CTR. (Aug. 5, 2012), https://web.archive.org/web/
20130928165026/https://media.ford.com/content/fordmedia/fna/us/en/news/2013/08/05/
model-t-facts.html [https://perma.cc/4CDW-QH2K] (noting that more than 15 million
Model T’s were ultimately sold to the American populace and that production stopped in
1927 to make way for new vehicles). By 1945, there were approximately 31,035,420 total
motor vehicles registered. See also State Motor Vehicle Registrations, By Years, 1990–1995,
FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/summary95/mv200.pdf [https://
perma.cc/MR3Z-CVSJ].
32. See Space News & Space.com Staff, Timeline: 50 Years of Spaceflight, SPACE.COM,
(Sept. 28, 2012), https://www.space.com/4422-timeline-50-years-spaceflight.html [https://
perma.cc/3LN3-FGXE] (noting that in 1942, Germany launched the first ballistic missile,
and by 1947 an American pilot broke the sound barrier for the first time). In 1942, the V-2
rocket climbed to 176 kilometers, becoming the first man-made object in space. AJEY
LELE, DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES FOR THE MILITARIES AND SECURITY 51 (2018).
33. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877) (demonstrating the first Supreme
Court case that analyzed personal jurisdiction); see also Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S.
117, 120 (2014) (showing one of the Court’s most recent cases on personal jurisdiction and
the expansion of personal jurisdiction).
34. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 720; see also Daimler, 571 U.S. at 120 (demonstrating the
slow growth of the courts to refine personal jurisdiction in the face of new technology).
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PROCESS

Doctrines surrounding the validity of service of process have been impacted by the rapid changes in the way in which messages are communicated to people and entities.35 Of course, the heart of service of process
has remained the same—the requirement of sufficient notice under due
process.36 The Court has long held that service must be such that it is
reasonably calculated to apprise parties of pending action against them
and to grant parties the opportunity to present their case.37
Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs service of process in civil suits, with the exception of the service of subpoenas, which is
governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45.38 As the Advisory Committee Notes to the 1993 Amendments of Rule 4 point out, “[u]nless service of the summons is waived, a summons must be served whenever a
person is joined as a party against whom a claim is made.”39 In federal
court, Rule 4 establishes three primary mechanisms of service on a domestic defendant: personal service, delivery to the defendant’s dwelling,
or delivery to an agent of the defendant.40 If these methods are unsuccessfully exhausted, Rule 4 then allows the plaintiff to use service methods that are blessed by state law or to seek an alternative form of
service.41
Among the earliest service of process cases are those that discuss the
appropriate mode of service in conjunction with due process. In Grannis
v. Ordean, decided in 1914, the Supreme Court addressed the use of the
mail and the newspaper as methods for service.42 Grannis involved a suit
for the partition of property, and the issue presented to the Court was
whether service by publication and by mail on “Albert Guilfuss” was sufficient to render a judgment binding on Mr. Albert B. Geilfuss.43 The
35. See How Technology is Changing the Nature of Service Delivery, SERV. FUTURES
https://www.servicefutures.com/technology-changing-nature-service-delivery [https://
perma.cc/7MUX-QVMA] (explaining how the emerging impact of technology has allowed
for more self-service and automated service solutions).
36. See generally Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
37. Id. at 314–15 (“The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the
required information, . . . and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make
their appearance . . . .”).
38. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 45.
39. FED. R. CIV. P. 4.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 388, 391–92 (1914).
43. Id. at 390–92. According to the Court, “George A. Elder, the owner of an undivided fifth interest in [certain] lands, commenced a partition suit in the district court of St.
Louis county . . . .” Id. at 337. The suit’s “sole purpose was to partition the lands, or, in case
a partition could not be had, then to have them sold and the proceeds of the sale distributed among the parties entitled.” Id. Albert B. Geilfuss, an assignee, resided at Milwaukee,
Wisconsin at the time of the partition action. Id. However, “[h]is correct name, ‘Albert B.
Geilfuss, assignee,’ or ‘Albert Geilfuss, assignee,’ did not appear among the names of the
defendants in the action, or in the summons or other files or records therein.” Id. at
387–88. Instead, “‘Albert Guilfuss, assignee,’ was named as a defendant, and . . . . [t]here
was no personal service of the summons in the partition action upon Geilfuss.” Id. at 338.
Instead, the sheriff had “deposited copies of the summons in the postoffice, with postage
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Court noted that “[t]he fundamental requis[i]te of due process of law is
the opportunity to be heard” and that “it is to [that] end, . . . that summons . . . is employed.”44 In determining whether the misspelling of
Geilfuss’ last name was a death knell to due process, the Court examined
the speed and skill of the post office as an entity.45 The Court noted that
even with the last name of the defendant misspelled, as it was in the case,
“[i]n view of the well-known skill of postal officials and employees in
making proper delivery of letters defectively addressed, we think the presumption is clear and strong that the letters would reach-indeed, that they
did reach-the true Albert B. Geilfuss in Milwaukee” and that most people realized for whom the notice was intended, even with the incorrect
spelling.46
At the time Grannis was decided, mail was delivered entirely in person—with hand-to-hand delivery required.47 If a mail recipient did not
answer the door, the carrier was required to keep the addressed mail and
redeliver it to the recipient when that recipient was home.48 It was not
until 1923 that mail slots were required for delivery service.49 In 1914, the
time of Grannis, carriers still spent an average of thirty minutes to one
hour per day waiting at doors for recipients to answer so that personal
delivery could be completed.50 As such, the equivalent of personal service
happened through the general mail delivery system, further ensuring that
defendants like Geilfuss could be assured receipt of summons when it was
sent through the mail.51
Post-1923, the mail continued to provide an allowable, if disfavored,
method of ensuring delivery of summons.52 But the development of technology, particularly the telex, brought additional questions about service
prepaid, directed to . . . Albert Guilfuss, assignee, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and one to Albert B. Guilfuss, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.” Id. “There was also service of the summons by
publication upon the defendants named therein as ‘Albert Guilfuss, assignee,’ and ‘Albert
B. Guilfuss,’ the summons being published in a legal newspaper in Duluth, which is in St.
Louis county, Minnesota.” Id.
44. Id. at 394.
45. Id. at 397–98.
46. See id.
47. See generally Sending and Receiving Mail, U.S. POSTAL SERV., https://pe.usps.com/
text/dmm100/sending-receiving.htm [https://perma.cc/A24H-4SQP] (explaining methods of
delivery if recipient is not home).
48. Id.
49. On This Day in Postal History: Notable Events by Month/Day/Year, U.S. POSTAL
SERV. 2 (March 2016), https://about.usps.com/who-we-are/postal-history/on-this-day.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GHM8-TERF] (“Mail slots or receptacles were first required for city delivery service.”); see also Household Mailboxes, NAT’L POSTAL MUSEUM, https://
web.archive.org/web/20121104032443/http://postalmuseum.si.edu/exhibits/
2b1b3_mailboxes.html [https://perma.cc/4CH4-6BB7].
50. Id.
51. See generally Grannis, 234 U.S. at 396–97.
52. See Mayoral-Amy v. BHI Corp., 180 F.R.D. 456, 460 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (“Under U.S.
law, that service of process via certain forms of mail satisfies due process requirements is
well settled.”).
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of process into consideration.53 In New England Merchants National
Bank v. Iran Power Generation & Transmission Co.,54 the Southern District of New York considered a case in which telex was used to serve
Iranian agencies and instrumentalities in a suit for monetary damages
arising out of the nationalization of private property in Iran.55 The plaintiffs sought attachment of monies of the defendants that were located in
New York, guided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 64,56 the New York
attachment statute,57 and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA).58
Pursuant to the FSIA, if “other methods of service are unavailable, the
court may fashion a mode of service ‘consistent with the law of the place
where service is to be made.’”59 Inspired by the failure of traditional
methods of service to reach the defendants in Iran, particularly mail with
return receipt, the court initiated a substitute form of service that would
provide defendants with adequate notice of the suit—a telex message60 to
the individual defendants in both Farsi and English. The court specifically
noted that this procedure “ha[d] little or no precedent in [its] jurisprudence.”61 In justifying service by this alternate technology, the court
reasoned:
Courts, however, cannot be blind to changes and advances in technology. No longer do we live in a world where communications are
conducted solely by mail carried by fast sailing clipper or steam
ships. Electronic communication via satellite can and does provide
instantaneous transmission of notice and information. No longer
must process be mailed to a defendant’s door when he can receive
complete notice at an electronic terminal inside his very office, even
53. See generally FAQ–Frequently Asked Questions, NETWORK TELEX, https://
www.networktelex.com/faq/ [https://perma.cc/EFK5-DVXK] (“Unlike facts or email, Telex
has full ‘legal document status’ in every country of the world.”).
54. See New England Merchs. Nat’l Bank v. Iran Power Generation & Transmission
Co., 495 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
55. Id. at 81. In keeping with the times, the district court judge began his opinion in
the following way: “The Iranian crisis! Demonstrations! Hostages! Diplomatic Ties Broken! The Aborted Rescue Attempt! These have been the headlines for most of the past
year. Paralleling these events, however, are other less dramatic problems which must be
solved in a dispassionate manner, one based in law and logic.” Id. at 75.
56. Id. at 76 (“At the commencement of and during the course of an action, all remedies providing for seizure of person or property for the purpose of securing satisfaction of
the judgment ultimately to be entered in the action are available under the circumstances
and in the manner provided by the law of the state in which the district court is held,
existing at the time the remedy is sought.” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 64)).
57. Id. (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6213 (MCKINNEY 2012)).
58. Id. at 78–79 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2006)).
59. Id. at 78.
60. For those who have forgotten the cutting-edge technology of the early 1980s, telex
is a communication service involving teletypewriters. See generally FAQ—Frequently
Asked Questions, NETWORK TELEX, supra note 53. It was developed during World War II
to safely and discretely transmit messages over long distances. Id. Telex services are still
available today and have full legal document status due to their safety and ability to prove
receipt through a unique electronic identifier within each message. Id.
61. New England Merchs. Nat’l Bank v. Iran Power Generation & Transmission Co.,
495 F. Supp. 73, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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when the door is steel and bolted shut.62
The telex method of service used in New England Merchants was reaffirmed in 1981 when another judge similarly ordered the use of telex service in a case brought by the Republic Bank of New York against the
president of an Iranian private joint stock company.63 The use of a telex
message as a means of service continues today, particularly in cases involving foreign defendants attempting to avoid service of process.64
In addition to telex, courts in the early 1980s began discussing the use
of the facsimile (fax) as an alternative method of electronic service.65 The
first federal case to examine the use of fax as a method of service was In
re International Telemedia Associates, Inc., a bankruptcy case decided in
2000 that involved attempted service by fax and e-mail on a defendant
who had refused to provide a street address to the plaintiff, stating that
“[f]rom now on, you may contact me by FAX.”66 The court noted that
because the only means of communication between the plaintiff and defendant had been electronic and by fax, the method had been authorized
by the defendant.67 Additional cases, up to the modern day, have also
verified the use of fax as a sometimes acceptable means of service.68
However, it should be noted that technology equivalent to fax was available as early as the American Civil War, and commercial use, including
image transmission, was possible in 1860 when the technology was
demonstrated to Napoleon.69 Indeed, when In re Telemedia was decided
in 2000, 3D fax was already available.70
In re Telemedia was also one of the earliest cases involving the use of email service.71 Utilizing the standard in Mullane, which asks a court to
62. Id.
63. See generally Republic Nat’l Bank of N.Y. v. Sabet, 512 F. Supp. 416, 418
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff’d mem., 681 F.2d 802 (2d Cir. 1981).
64. See Harris Corp. v. Nat’l Iranian Radio & Television, 691 F.2d 1344, 1347 (11th
Cir. 1982) (upholding service via telex on Iranian defendants); see also Int’l Schs. Serv. v.
Gov’t of Iran, 505 F. Supp. 178, 179 (D.N.J. 1981) (authorizing telex service on government-controlled Iranian corporations noting that “[m]odern technology, with communications satellites and other sophisticated devices, ought not to be deprived the opportunity to
attempt effective service, if it can”).
65. See Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Veles Ltd., No. 06 Cv 2988 (GBD), 2007 WL 725412,
at *3 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 13, 2007) (holding that the service of process by e-mail and fax was
adequate).
66. In re Int’l Telemedia Assocs., Inc., 245 B.R. 713, 718–19 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000).
67. Id. at 722.
68. See, e.g., Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Bahattab, No. 07-1771(PLF), 2008 WL 250584,
at *2 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 2008) (fax service allowed on foreign defendants avoiding traditional
service); see also Mayoral-Amy v. BHI Corp., 180 F.R.D. 456, 460 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (service
by fax not allowed on Belizean defendants).
69. See generally The History of Fax (from 1843 to Present Day), FAXAUTHORITY
(Mar. 5, 2020), https://faxauthority.com/fax-history/ [https://perma.cc/K88S-KZKU].
70. In re Telemedia, 245 B.R. at 713; see The History of Fax (from 1843 to Present
Day), supra note 69 (“3D Fax became a method of scanning and transmitting 3-dimensional data.”).
71. See In re Telemedia, 245 B.R. at 720 (noting that the only case prior to have authorized service by e-mail was an English case four years prior); see Frank Conley, Comment, :-) Service with a Smiley: The Effect of E-mail and Other Electronic Communications
on Service of Process, 11 TEMP. INT’L & COMPAR. L.J. 407, 427–28 (1997) (examining an
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ensure that notice is “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances,
to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action,”72 the
Telemedia court noted that the defendant’s preference for e-mail communication meant that the use of such a channel must necessarily indicate
that the defendant was likely to receive the summons.73 In discussing the
changing technology at issue, the court stated that “communication by
facsimile transmission and electronic mail have now become commonplace in our increasingly global society. The federal courts are not required to turn a blind eye to society’s embracement of such technological
advances.”74 This statement came just in time—in 2000, the e-mail platform Hotmail alone had 100 million subscribers.75
Following In re Telemedia, additional courts sanctioned the use of email as a method of service.76 Among the most cited is Rio Properties,
Inc. v. Rio International Interlink,77 a Ninth Circuit case that addressed
the constitutional ramifications of e-mail service. The foreign defendant78
in that case could only be contacted by its e-mail address, and the court
was quick to point out that this made e-mail the method of service most
English High Court case authorizing service by electronic mail). At least one American
court in the previous year had rejected the use of e-mail service. See also WAWA, Inc. v.
Christensen, No. CIV. A. 99-1454, 1999 WL 557936, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 29, 1999) (“Electronic mail (‘email’) is not an approved method of service under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4. The Judicial Conference Rules Committee has discussed and recommended a
change in Fed.R.Civ.P. 4 to permit service by electronic transmission. But at this time,
email is not a valid means for delivering a summons and complaint to a defendant.”).
72. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
73. In re Telemedia, 245 B.R. at 721.
74. Id. (discussing New England Merchs. Nat’l Bank v. Iran Power Generation &
Transmission Co., 495 F. Supp. 73, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
75. ED KELLER & JON BERRY, THE INFLUENTIALS: ONE AMERICAN IN TEN TELLS
THE OTHER NINE HOW TO VOTE, WHERE TO EAT, AND WHAT TO BUY 318 (2003).
76. Se Fraserside IP LLC v. Letyagin, 280 F.R.D. 630, 630–31 (N.D. Iowa 2012) (permitting service via e-mail on “international intellectual property scofflaws”); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Rubio, No. 12–CV–22129, 2012 WL 3614360, at *3
(S.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2012) (permitting e-mail service on an individual evading service
outside the United States); Williams v. Advert. Sex LLC, 231 F.R.D. 483, 488 (N.D.W. Va.
2005) (“The authorization of e-mail as an alternative means for service of process under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3) is a matter of first impression for this Court. . . .
[T]he Court concludes that service of process by electronic mail is authorized by and warranted under Rule 4(f)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”); Popular Enters., LLC
v. Webcom Media Grp., Inc., 225 F.R.D. 560, 563 (E.D. Tenn. 2004) (permitting e-mail as a
valid form of alternative service of process for a difficult to locate defendant, stating, “Accordingly, the court concludes that, under the facts in this action, service upon defendant
by e-mail is fully authorized by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3). Indeed, it is the
method of service most likely to reach defendant.”).
77. 284 F.3d 1007, 1018 (9th Cir. 2002).
78. Ronald J. Hedges et al., Electronic Service of Process at Home and Abroad: Allowing Domestic Electronic Service of Process in the Federal Courts, 4 FED. CTS. L. REV.
55, 56 (2010) (“Currently, electronic service of process is only available in federal practice
under [Rule] 4(f)(3) . . . in the context of ‘Serving an Individual in a Foreign Country.’”).
When a domestic defendant is involved, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) “does not
permit electronic mail as a means of substituted service unless the state where the action is
brought permits it.” Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Shepard, No. 4:12CV1728 SNLJ, 2013
WL 4058745, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 12, 2013) (noting that “Missouri does not authorize
electronic mail as a form of substituted service” and denying plaintiff’s motion for substituted service by e-mail).
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likely to reach the defendant79:
Indeed, when faced with an international e-business scofflaw, playing
hide-and-seek with the federal court, email may be the only means of
effecting service of process. Certainly in this case, it was a means
reasonably calculated to apprise [defendant] of the pendency of the
lawsuit, and the Constitution requires nothing more.80
Interesting in the Rio analysis is the court’s discussion of e-mail as a
novel concept.81 The court noted that, in 2002, “communication via email
and over the Internet [was] comparatively new.”82 In 2002, 9.1% of the
entire global population was using the internet—approximately 569 million people.83 A nationwide survey by the Pew Research Center showed
that eight in ten adults went online to get news during the 2002 elections.84 Such statistics are the product of the long history of e-mail, which
was actually invented at MIT as early as 1965 for use on ARPANET.85
Queen Elizabeth II sent her first e-mail in 1976, and Microsoft Mail was
released for consumer use in 1988.86 By the time of Telemedia and Rio,
even the use of e-mail spam was ancient history, having been first documented in 1994.87
With e-mail now old news, an open question remains as to service conducted by social media websites.88 In domestic suits, plaintiffs seeking so79. “Unlike the Iranian officials in New England Merchants, [the defendant] had
neither an office nor a door; it had only a computer terminal. If any method of communication is reasonably calculated to provide . . . notice, surely it is email . . . .” Rio Props., Inc. v.
Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1018 (9th Cir. 2002).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1016–17.
82. Id. at 1017.
83. See John Koetsier, The Internet 2002–2012: What a Difference a Decade Makes,
VENTUREBEAT (Aug. 14, 2012, 3:26 PM), https://venturebeat.com/2012/08/14/the-internet2002-2012-infographic/ [https://perma.cc/4UYZ-GFC6] (“Microsoft’s Internet Explorer
had 95 percent market share. And less than 600 million people were online globally . . . .”).
84. The Internet and Campaign 2002, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 5, 2003), https://
www.pewinternet.org/2003/01/05/the-internet-and-campaign-2002/ [https://perma.cc/4Q37F8NN] (“Nearly eight-in-ten (79%) did this in 2002, up from 69% in 2000.”).
85. Samuel Gibbs, How Did Email Grow from Messages Between Academics to a
Global Epidemic?, GUARDIAN (Mar. 7, 2016, 10:07), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/mar/07/email-ray-tomlinson-history [https://perma.cc/HMX9-BRA2] (“The very
first version of what would become known as email was invented in 1965 at Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT) as part of the university’s Compatible Time-Sharing System,
which allowed users to share files and messages on a central disk, logging in from remote
terminals.”). The Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET) was a series
of computers networked together by scientists and academics that could communicate in
the event of a nuclear attack. Id. It is considered the first iteration of the internet. Id.
86. Id.
87. See generally id. (Microsoft Outlook, a hallmark of today’s business and personal
e-mail communication, was released in 1993, and according to some, has not gotten better
since).
88. It should be noted that other countries have been more open to allowing service by
social media, and several countries have permitted service of process through social media.
Keely Knapp, #Serviceofprocess@Socialmedia: Accepting Social Media for Service of Process in the 21st Century, 74 LA. L. REV. 547, 570–71 (2014) (noting that Australia, Canada,
and the United Kingdom have allowed service by social media); see also Angela Upchurch,
“Hacking” Service of Process: Using Social Media to Provide Constitutionally Sufficient
Notice of Process, 38 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 559, 575 (2016) (“While service of
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cial media service have been less lucky.89 In Fortunato v. Chase Bank
USA, N.A., a third-party plaintiff sought service by Facebook on a domestic defendant that was evading service of process by providing fake or
outdated addresses.90 Indeed, the defendant was so effective at avoiding
service that even a private investigator had not been able to determine a
correct address.91 Noting that “[s]ervice by Facebook is unorthodox to
say the least” and that no precedent could be established for Facebook
service, the court stated that “anyone can make a Facebook profile using
real, fake, or incomplete information, and thus, there is no way for the
Court to confirm whether the Nicole Fortunato the investigator found is
in fact the third-party Defendant to be served.”92 As such, alternative
service by Facebook was denied.93
Other courts have allowed social media service through platforms like
LinkedIn,94 Facebook, and, in a rare instance, Twitter.95 Key to these
courts’ analyses was a record that the account at issue was operational96
and accessed by the defendant, and that the defendant was overall likely
to receive the message.97 However, courts can be hostile to service acprocess via social media may still be viewed as ‘unorthodox’ by courts in the United States,
foreign court systems have been more willing to order service of process via social media.”). While rarer in the United States, service of process by social media does happen.
See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. PCCare247 Inc., No. 12 Civ. 7189(PAE), 2013 WL 841037, at
*4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2013); Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., No. 11 Civ. 6608(JFK),
2012 WL 2086950, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2012).
89. See Amanda Sexton, Service of Process via Social Media, L. PRAC. TODAY (Jan. 13,
2017), https://www.lawpracticetoday.org/article/service-process-via-social-media/ [https://
perma.cc/39KT-68UW] (“Service by social media remains relatively uncharted waters with
the exception of a handful of cases.”).
90. Fortunato, 2012 WL 2086950, at *2.
91. Id. at *1.
92. Id. at *2.
93. Id. at *3. The court’s decision to deny social media service was grounded on the
holding that it was not likely to result in actual notice to the defendant, since the Facebook
account could very well be fake. Id. at *2. Instead, the court ordered service by publication
in a newspaper. Id. at *3. Interestingly, one of the newspapers selected to use for service
was based on the physical location provided in the Facebook account at issue—Hastings,
New York. Id. at *3.
94. See WhosHere, Inc. v. Orun, No. 1:13-cv-00526-AJT-TRJ, 2014 WL 670817, at *1
(E.D. Va. Feb. 20, 2014).
95. See St. Francis Assisi v. Kuwait Fin. House, No. 3:16-cv-3240-LB, 2016 WL
5725002, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2016); see also Martha Neil, UK’s High Court OKs
Serving Injunction on Anonymous Blogger via Twittter, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 2, 2009, 5:29 PM),
https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
uk_high_court_uses_twitter_to_serve_injunction_on_anonymous_blogger/ [https://
perma.cc/M66N-ZVVW].
96. See WhosHere, 2014 WL 670817, at *4 (permitting service on defendant through email, LinkedIn, and Facebook, having found that, “[c]ollectively, these four methods are
highly likely to provide defendant notice of this litigation, because defendant himself provided plaintiff with these email contacts, and also referred plaintiff to the social networking
profiles which appear to be regularly viewed and maintained by defendant”).
97. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. PCCare247 Inc., No. 12 Civ. 7189(PAE), 2013 WL
841037, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2013) (permitting service through e-mail and Facebook
where the movant had “set forth facts that suppl[ied] ample reason for confidence that the
Facebook accounts identified [were] actually operated by defendants”); see also Baidoo v.
Blood-Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709, 716 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015) (permitting service through
Facebook where plaintiff had submitted a supplemental affidavit with copies of exchanges
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complished only through social media and instead expect such service to
operate as an alternate or backup form of service and notice.98 In Federal
Trade Commission v. PCCARE247 Inc., the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) successfully convinced the district court to allow service by
Facebook when it had an additional independent ground for service.99
The court noted that e-mail service would be constitutionally permissible
because the defendant ran an online business, frequently used e-mail to
communicate, and had even used e-mail communication in connection
with the underlying action.100 Under these circumstances, e-mail service
alone met constitutional muster.101 Service by Facebook was allowed as a
secondary method.102
The PCCare247 court’s discussion of service by Facebook showed conflicting feelings about the progression of social media and technology.103
On one hand, the court noted that service by Facebook is a “relatively
novel concept,” and that “if the FTC were proposing to serve defendants
only by means of Facebook, as opposed to using Facebook as a supplemental means of service, a substantial question would arise whether that
service comports with due process.”104 Despite these misgivings, the
court also indicated a preference for technological progress, noting that
“as technology advances and modes of communication progress, courts
must be open to considering requests to authorize service via technological means of then-recent vintage, rather than dismissing them out of hand

that took place between her and defendant through Facebook); Silverman v. Sito Mktg.
LLC, No. 14-CV-3932 (WFK), 2015 WL 13649821, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 21, 2015) (“Here,
plaintiff has proffered no evidence whatsoever that [the defendant] would be likely to click
on a link that was ‘tweeted’ at him on Twitter or sent in a private LinkedIn message.”).
98. See PCCare247, 2013 WL 841037, at *5 (permitting Facebook service coupled with
service by e-mail to e-mail addresses that were “demonstrably used,” noting that “if the
[plaintiff] were proposing to serve defendants only by means of Facebook, as opposed to
using Facebook as a supplemental means of service, a substantial question would arise
whether that service comports with due process”).
99. Id. at *5–6.
100. Id. at *6.
101. Id. at *4 (“Service by email alone comports with due process where a plaintiff
demonstrates that the email is likely to reach the defendant.”); see also Williams-Sonoma
Inc. v. Friendfinder Inc., No. C 06-06572 JSW, 2007 WL 1140639, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17,
2007) (holding service by e-mail appropriate when the plaintiff had used the e-mail addresses at issue to communicate with the defendants previously).
102. The court provided a thorough description of the process that would be used:
For the uninitiated, such service would work as follows: The FTC would send
a Facebook message, which is not unlike an email, to the Facebook account
of each individual defendant, attaching the relevant documents. Defendants
would be able to view these messages when they next log on to their
Facebook accounts (and, depending on their settings, might even receive
email alerts upon receipt of such messages).
PCCare247, 2013 WL 841037, at *5.
103. See generally id.
104. Id. (quoting the Fortunato court’s concern that anyone can produce a fake
Facebook profile, thus making it difficult for the court to confirm if the summons reached
the defendant).

2020]

Machine Learning

507

as novel.”105 These conflicted feelings suggest that although the courts
see the coming technological change in service of process, conceptions of
traditional due process have not quite expanded to fit the bill.106
B. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
As noted above, personal jurisdiction is slow to respond to technological growth and adaptation. And like service of process, courts seem to
recognize that a new dawn is coming, but they have yet to fully embrace
reform in legal structures like minimum contacts or presence in a
jurisdiction.
Early American conceptions of personal jurisdiction were based on
physical presence.107 As such, a court could not exercise power over the
defendant unless the defendant was physically located in the state.108 This
bright line guided early cases like Pennoyer v. Neff, which was based entirely on principles of state sovereignty.109 Under the Pennoyer approach,
jurisdiction was appropriate when the defendant: (1) was physically present and served in the state, (2) was domiciled in the state, or (3) had
consented to jurisdiction in the state.110 This test struggled mightily with
the creation and operation of interstate corporations, which were “born”
of state law and could do business anywhere through agents.111 Courts
attempted to bootstrap corporate personal jurisdiction into Pennoyer by
fictionalizing that the corporation was physically present in the state
when it was “doing business” in the state.112
105. Id. (“As the Ninth Circuit has stated, the due process reasonableness inquiry ‘unshackles the federal courts from anachronistic methods of service and permits them entry
into the technological renaissance.’”) (internal citation omitted).
106. It is interesting that service by publication is more favored than service by social
media. Newspaper publication is expensive, and the number of people who read newspapers is dropping rapidly. See Alyssa L. Eisenberg, Keep Your Facebook Friends Close and
Your Process Server Closer: The Expansion of Social Media Service of Process to Cases
Involving Domestic Defendants, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 779, 808–10 (2014). In contrast, the
use of social media platforms is on the rise, thus suggesting service by social media is more
likely to actually reach an individual defendant. See id. at 809–11 (noting that “[i]n 2012,
only thirty-eight percent of Americans said they regularly read any type of daily newspaper, and twenty-three percent of the population said they read a print newspaper the day
before . . . . [but] seventy-two percent of adult Americans use social networking sites” and
that “the amount of time social media users spend on social networking sites is about seven
times the amount of time they spend reading print newspapers and almost 192 times the
amount of time they spend reading online newspapers”).
107. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (“Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is grounded on their de facto power over
the defendant’s person. Hence his presence within the territorial jurisdiction of court was
prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally binding him.”).
108. Id.
109. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877).
110. Id. at 721–23.
111. Id. at 735–36.
112. For a peek into this problem at the time, see William F. Cahill, Jurisdiction over
Foreign Corporations and Individuals Who Carry on Business Within the Territory, 30
HARV. L. REV. 676 (1917). Written in 1917 (over twenty-five years before International
Shoe), the article explains that jurisdiction can be achieved over corporations that give
consent to service in the state, or are doing business in the state. Id.
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The “doing business” test, which considered the presence of an office,
employees, or transactions in the state,113 ultimately failed to accurately
capture whether a corporation was “in” the state for purposes of personal
jurisdiction—results were too inconsistent, making it difficult for corporations to plan their behavior.114 As such, the Court moved on to International Shoe, which, as noted above, arose from the needs of the modern
marketplace and modern transportation.115 International Shoe seemed
more comfortable with entities that did not have flesh and bone presence
in a state—its famous minimum contacts test used the defendant’s behavior, not its physical presence, to craft an analysis that sketched out constitutional minimums for personal jurisdiction116 The court stated:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.”117
The International Shoe court went on to distinguish between two
branches of personal jurisdiction—what we now call specific jurisdiction
and general jurisdiction.118 Pursuant to specific jurisdiction, the defendant’s contacts are a proper basis of jurisdiction when those contacts give
rise to the claim at issue.119 In contrast, general jurisdiction existed, according to the International Shoe court, when “continuous corporate operations within a state [are] so substantial and of such a nature as to
justify suit . . . on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct
from those activities.”120 And thus, the twin tests of modern personal jurisdiction were born.
1. General Jurisdiction
Each prong of personal jurisdiction, specific and general, has seen its
own growth in response to technological changes. Arguably, general jurisdiction has been impacted more than specific jurisdiction, with courts
struggling to reconcile the notion of deep contacts with the state with the
development of the internet, social media, and global transactions.121 The
113. Zoe Niesel, Daimler and the Jurisdictional Triskelion, 82 TENN. L. REV. 833, 842
(2015) (“A number of cases suggested that factors, such as an office, employees, or transactions, would be used to determine if a corporation was doing business in the forum. However, it was unclear at what point activities crossed from mere solicitation in the forum into
the equivalent of physical presence.”).
114. Id.
115. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945).
116. See id.
117. Id. at 316.
118. Id. at 317–18.
119. Id. at 317.
120. See id. at 318.
121. See generally Elijah VanKuren, Purposeful Availment: Personal Jurisdiction in the
Internet Context, CAMPBELL L. OBSERVER (Jan. 18, 2016), http://campbelllawobserver.com/
purposeful-availment-personal-jurisdiction-in-the-internet-context/ [https://perma.cc/
T6R7-42SB].
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first major post-International Shoe cases on general jurisdiction were Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.122 and Helicopteros Nacionales
de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall.123 The time gap between these cases is large—
Perkins was decided in 1952, while Helicopteros was decided in 1984. Perkins involved a foreign corporation that was operating in Ohio during the
hostilities of World War II.124 In Ohio, the corporate president took a
number of actions in the name of the company, including opening bank
accounts, paying salaries, conducting directors’ meetings, and supervising
construction and rehabilitation of corporate properties.125 When the company was sued in Ohio for failing to issue stock certificates, the plaintiff
prevailed in establishing general jurisdiction because the corporate president was engaging in the “continuous and systematic supervision of the
necessarily limited wartime activities of the company,”126 essentially
meaning that all corporate operations were being conducted in Ohio.127
In Helicopteros,128 the Court reached a different finding. Survivors of
the American citizens killed in a helicopter crash in Peru sued the Colombian corporate defendant in Texas based on a theory of general jurisdiction.129 The plaintiffs pointed to multiple contacts that the defendant had
with Texas: it had purchased corporate equipment there, it trained personnel there, it had drawn payments on a Texas bank, and it had negotiated corporate contracts in Texas.130 The Court was not persuaded,
noting that the “‘relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation’ is the essential foundation of in personam jurisdiction.”131 Citing Perkins, the Court dismantled each of the contacts brought forth by
the plaintiffs, noting mere transactions and negotiations in the forum did
not rise to the level of “continuous and systematic” contacts.132
The difference between Perkins and Helicopteros may, in part, be one
of time. In 1952, at the time that Perkins was decided, it was more diffi122. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
123. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
124. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 438.
125. Id. at 447–48.
126. Id. at 448.
127. Id. at 445–46 (“[I]f the same corporation carries on, in that state, other continuous
and systematic corporate activities as it did here—consisting of directors’ meetings, business correspondence, banking, stock transfers, payment of salaries, purchasing of machinery, etc.—those activities are enough to make it fair and reasonable to subject that
corporation to proceedings in personam in that state, at least insofar as the proceedings in
personam seek to enforce causes of action relating to . . . other activities of the corporation
within the state.”).
128. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
129. Id. at 409–10.
130. Id. at 410–11.
131. Id. at 414 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
132. The court specifically found that the defendant did not have a place of business in
Texas: One trip by the CEO to Texas could not support personal jurisdiction. Id. at 416–18.
There was no indication that the company requested their checks to be drawn on a Texas
bank—the decision to draw the checks on a Texas bank was the unilateral activity of the
bank. Id. Further, purchases and trips could not alone form the basis of personal jurisdiction, and the brief presence of employees in Texas for training was not significant. Id.
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cult for corporations to operate on an international scale.133 In contrast,
by 1984, commercial planes,134 phones, fax, telex, and the early internet
had made communication, and business, more prevalent across forums.135
It was no longer burdensome or unexpected for a corporate agent to fly
to multiple locations to conduct business or to conduct business remotely.136 In this proliferation of business and business contacts, general
jurisdiction strained to make sense. As such, in 2011 and 2014, the Court
further clarified general jurisdiction in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown137 and Daimler AG v. Bauman.138 In Goodyear, the
plaintiffs were attempting to sue two foreign subsidiaries of Goodyear
Tires in North Carolina based on the fact that the subsidiaries participated in a larger distribution scheme overseen by an American parent
company and that the foreign manufactured tires had reached the North
Carolina forum through this scheme.139 In wrestling with the plaintiffs’
broad interpretation of “continuous and systematic contacts,” the Court
amended its test, holding that “a court may assert general jurisdiction
over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to hear any and
all claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.”140
Daimler, which also involved a foreign corporation being sued in the
United States based on its parent company, further defined “at home” to
mean either the state of incorporation or the principal place of business.141 As such, general jurisdiction now exists, for practical purposes,
for a corporate entity in its place of incorporation or at the location of its
headquarters.142
133. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
134. While plane travel certainly existed in 1952, it was more limited and not used as
liberally for business transactions. See Tony Long, May 2, 1952: First Commercial Jet Flies
from London to Johannesburg, WIRED (May 2, 2012, 6:38 AM), https://www.wired.com/
2012/05/may-2-1952-first-commercial-jet-flies-from-london-to-johannesburg/ [https://
perma.cc/YYQ2-4H8M]. Indeed, the first commercial flight from London to Johannesburg
did not occur until 1952. Id. Celebrated as a technological marvel at the time, the plane
that made the flight crashed off the Italian coast later that year, killing all passengers
aboard. Id.
135. See GENPACT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY ON BUSINESS
PROCESS OPERATIONS (2014), https://www.genpact.com/downloadable-content/insight/theimpact-of-technology-on-business-process-operations.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZKV3-JRWY]
(“The estimated impact from improved use of technology – when applicable – for finance
and accounting processes was the highest across all functions and significantly higher than
other levers.”).
136. See Long, supra note 134.
137. 564 U.S. 915 (2011).
138. 571 U.S. 117 (2014).
139. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 918–20.
140. Id. at 919 (emphasis added).
141. See Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at 137.
142. It should be noted that general jurisdiction based on some type of continuous contacts was not entirely foreclosed by the Daimler court. Id. at 138–39. The court referenced
an “exceptional” case like Perkins, which would provide contacts “so substantial and of
such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that State.” Id. at 139 n.19. As noted
above, Perkins involved all corporate operations conducted in the state, and essentially
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The “at home” standard, while arguably clarifying general jurisdiction
for non-physical corporate entities, has done little to enlighten how general jurisdiction should apply to non-physical, technological mediums like
the internet.143 In deciding such cases, courts default to the principle that
general jurisdiction “is an exacting standard, as it should be, because a
finding of general jurisdiction permits a defendant to be haled into court
in the forum state to answer for any of its activities anywhere in the
world.”144 More extremely, courts have noted that if the use of interactive exchanges on the internet were the basis of general jurisdiction, “we
would soon face the inevitable demise of all restrictions on the personal
jurisdiction of the courts.”145 Therefore, modern courts pre- and postGoodyear and Daimler have largely held that no general jurisdiction can
exist for non-physical online activities.146 This seems particularly clear afalso involved the location of the corporate headquarters in the state. See Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447–49 (1952). As such, it is hard to imagine
what “exceptional” circumstances might exist that provide general jurisdiction outside of
the twin bases from Daimler. The Daimler standard was confirmed again by the Court in
BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017), which re-asserted that the “at home”
standard applies to all state-court assertions of jurisdiction over nonresident defendants
and does not vary depending on the underlying claim. Quoting Daimler, the BNSF Court
noted that “the general jurisdiction inquiry does not focus solely on the magnitude of the
defendant’s in-state contacts” and that significant infrastructure or number of employees in
the forum do not substitute for principal place of business or state of incorporation. Id. at
1559.
143. See generally Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at 117.
144. Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 2004).
145. See Eon Corp. v. AT & T Mobility, LLC, 879 F. Supp. 2d 194, 207 (D.P.R. 2012).
146. See Campbell Pet Co. v. Miale, 542 F.3d 879, 884 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding internet
sales of $14,000 insufficient for general jurisdiction); see also Shrader v. Biddinger, 633 F.3d
1235 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding operation of online discussion forum was not the basis of
general jurisdiction); Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 451–52 (3d Cir.
2003) (holding that “the mere operation of a commercially interactive web site should not
subject the operator to jurisdiction anywhere in the world”); Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467,
471 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding online subscription sales to be insufficient for general jurisdiction); Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 873–74 (6th Cir. 2002) (4,666 internet domain-name
registrations in the forum were insufficient for general jurisdiction); Soma Med. Int’l v.
Standard Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292, 1299 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding operation of website insufficient for general jurisdiction); Pickering v. ADP Dealer Servs., Inc., No. 12 C
6256, 2013 WL 996212, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2013) (“The Court is unaware of any case,
and Pickering has cited none, in which a court has found general jurisdiction simply on the
basis of a defendant’s website, even when the website was used to make sales directly into
the forum state.”); Fed. Ins. Co. v. BMO Harris Bank, NA, No. SA–12–CA–112, 2012 WL
12887904, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2012) (finding no general jurisdiction where “BMO
Harris maintain[ed] an interactive website through which customers [could] open new deposit accounts, check account balances, transfer funds between BMO Harris accounts, pay
bills, and manage finances. Over 2,000 of BMO Harris’s active online deposit accounts
belong[ed] to Texas residents. Some of these accounts were opened by Texas residents
while they were in Texas. However, BMO Harris maintain[ed] no offices or branches in
Texas, [did] not advertise in Texas, and [was] not registered to do business in Texas”); Eon
Corp., 879 F. Supp. at 207 (“ATT–M’s activities, conducted via the AT & T Web site, are
insufficient to warrant general jurisdiction.”); PowerHour, L.L.C. v. Brain Swell Media,
L.L.C., No. 2:11CV356, 2011 WL 4702915, at *5 (D. Utah Oct. 4, 2011) (holding that defendant that did business in the forum over the internet and entered into contracts with forum
residents was not subject to general jurisdiction in the state); Nationwide Contractor Audit
Serv., Inc. v. Nat’l Compliance Mgmt. Serv., Inc., 622 F.Supp.2d 276, 292 (W.D. Pa. 2008)
(noting that “courts have been reluctant to find general jurisdiction based on internet con-
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ter the adoption of the “at home” test, as website activities cannot be the
basis of either paradigmatic basis (state of incorporation or location of
the headquarters) for general jurisdiction.147
2. Specific Jurisdiction
Unlike cases involving general jurisdiction, the landmark cases for specific jurisdiction have been more forward about addressing the impacts
that technological progress have on personal jurisdiction.
Since International Shoe, Supreme Court cases have clarified, to some
extent, what it means to have minimum contacts in a forum that gives rise
to the claim at issue. In 1957, just five years after Perkins shed additional
light on general jurisdiction, the Court decided McGee v. International
Life Insurance Co.148 McGee is noteworthy because it tackled head-on
the notions of technological and societal progress, which is particularly
interesting considering that the facts are somewhat bland149: “In 1944,
Lowell Franklin, a resident of California, purchased a life insurance policy from . . . an Arizona corporation.”150 The insurance obligations were
assumed by the Texas corporation International Life Insurance Company,
and Lowell paid International Life Insurance premiums until his death,
tacts only, even in those cases where the websites are highly interactive”). The same results
have been reached regarding social media, such as Facebook and Twitter. See Georgalis v.
Facebook, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 3d 955, 959 (N.D. Ohio 2018), reconsideration denied, No. 1:18
CV 256, 2018 WL 6018017 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 16, 2018) (“Defendant [correctly] maintains
that Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege general jurisdiction because Facebook is incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in California, and Facebook’s affiliation with Ohio are not so continuo[u]s and systematic as to render Defendant ‘at home’ in
the State of Ohio.”); see also Corcera Sols., LLC v. Razor, Inc., No. 5:13–CV–05113–PSG,
2014 WL 587869, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2014), on reconsideration in part, No. 5:13-CV05113-PSG, 2014 WL 4792548 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2014) (finding no general jurisdiction
based on the use of Facebook, Linked In, Twitter, and GooglePlus).
147. For any stray decisions that do find internet-based general jurisdiction, see
Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2003) (internet contacts
appropriate for general jurisdiction), vacated as moot 398 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2005) and
Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., 293 F.3d 506, 513 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding internet
contacts appropriate for general jurisdiction). It appears now that such cases are inapposite
with Daimler and Goodyear. See Kenney v. Lofts at Sodo, No. 18-11332(FLW), 2019 WL
1057365, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 6, 2019) (“Plaintiff argues that general jurisdiction exists because Defendant maintains an apartment rental website, accessible to New Jersey residents, for its properties in Florida. For support, Plaintiff relies on a pre-Daimler, district
court opinion . . . for the proposition that courts may exercise personal (general) jurisdiction over a defendant based on the existence of an internet site. . . . [This case] is simply
unpersuasive in light of Daimler, which decision has effectively narrowed the scope of general jurisdiction over corporate defendants . . . .”); see also Kearney v. Good Start Genetics, Inc., No. 17-2363, 2017 WL 6206168, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2017) (disagreeing with
plaintiff’s attempt to argue website contacts as the basis for general jurisdiction based on
the fact that the forum was “not a ‘paradigm’ forum in which Defendant is ‘at home’ for
the purposes of personal jurisdiction”) (internal citation omitted); First Metro. Church of
Hous. v. Genesis Grp., No. H-14-2786, 2015 WL 11170733, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2015),
aff’d, 616 F. App’x 148 (5th Cir. 2015) (“Maintaining a passive website that lists a Texas
church as a reference does not constitute an affiliation with the State of Texas that is so
continuous and systematic that Defendant is ‘essentially at home’ in Texas.”).
148. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
149. Id. at 221 (calling the facts of the case “relatively simple”).
150. Id.
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mailing them from California to Texas.151 His mother ultimately sued to
receive the benefits.152 The Court found specific jurisdiction in California
on these facts, even though this was the only insurance policy the company had issued in California.153 Simply put, even though there was one
contact with California, this contact gave rise to the plaintiff’s claim.154 In
so holding, the Court commented on technological progress: “[M]any
commercial transactions touch two or more States and may involve parties separated by the full continent. With this increasing nationalization of
commerce has come a great increase in the amount of business conducted
by mail across state lines.”155 Looking back, it is interesting to think of
increased business by mail serving as a watershed moment when the
growth of online transactions and business exchanges in the modern era
has reached all-time highs.
The automobile as a means of transportation technology and its relationship to specific jurisdiction was addressed almost thirty years later in
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.156 In Woodson, the plaintiffs
sued a vehicle distributor in New York for injuries sustained when a defect in the car caused injury while the plaintiffs were passing through
Oklahoma.157 The Court rejected the Oklahoma contact as a basis for
specific jurisdiction, noting that the defendants should only be subject to
jurisdiction where they “should reasonably anticipate being haled into
court.”158 Such anticipation could not be found on the facts of the case
because the defendants did not have activity in Oklahoma, including
sales, services, advertisements, or any other activity designed to capture
any share of the Oklahoma market.159 In its holding, the Court rejected
the notion that a physical object, although designed to be mobile, could
alone serve as a basis for specific jurisdiction when taken into the forum
by the plaintiff.160
Later, in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, the Court addressed the flip
side—whether the lack of a physical object in the forum would prevent a
finding of specific jurisdiction.161 In Burger King, the defendants opened
a restaurant franchise in Michigan, and the franchise contract stated that
the laws of Florida would govern.162 The franchisor, Burger King, sued
the defendants in Florida for trademark infringement and breach of the
franchise obligations after the defendants refused to close their location
due to poor sales.163 The defendants claimed that the dispute did not
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 221–22.
Id. at 222.
Id. at 222–23.
Id.
Id. at 223.
444 U.S. 286 (1980).
Id. at 288.
Id. at 297–98.
Id. at 289.
Id. at 295.
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985).
Id. at 465–67.
Id. at 468–69.
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arise out of their contacts with Florida.164
The Court’s holding in Burger King was based on the notion of purposeful direction—i.e., whether the defendant purposefully directed its
activities at forum residents.165 In making that assessment, the Court examined whether there was “some act by which the defendant purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”166
This inquiry, for the first time, was entirely decoupled from physical presence—the defendants had only briefly appeared in Florida for a training
session.167 However, the Court found that the defendants were subject to
specific personal jurisdiction in Florida based on their decision to enter
into a long-term agreement with a Florida corporation that had provided
them significant benefits.168 The Court commented on changing commercial practices, noting that
[j]urisdiction in these circumstances may not be avoided merely because the defendant did not physically enter the forum State. Although territorial presence frequently will enhance a potential
defendant’s affiliation with a State and reinforce the reasonable foreseeability of suit there, it is an inescapable fact of modern commercial life that a substantial amount of business is transacted solely by
mail and wire communications across state lines, thus obviating the
need for physical presence within a State in which business is
conducted.169
In Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court,170 decided in 1987,
the Court assessed more physical notions of specific jurisdiction when it
decided whether specific jurisdiction should exist when a company delivered “its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that
they [would] be purchased by consumers in the forum State.”171 A plurality of the Court returned to Burger King, holding that specific jurisdiction
requires “an action of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State.”172 And therefore, “[t]he placement of a product into the
stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State.”173 This “more” could involve
designing the product for a certain market, advertising in the forum, or
advising customers in the forum (such as a helpline).174
164. Id. at 469
165. Id. at 472–73.
166. Id. at 475 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
167. Id. at 479.
168. Id. at 479–80.
169. Id. at 476.
170. 480 U.S. 102, 103 (1987).
171. Id. at 109.
172. Id. at 112 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476).
173. Id.
174. Id. Justice Brennan also authored an opinion in Asahi, which stated that placing a
product in the stream of commerce with knowledge it is being marketed downstream is
sufficient to show purposeful direction. Id. at 116–17 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). Justice Brennan noted that “[a]s long as a participant in this
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The application of Burger King and Asahi in response to the internet
and other more emerging technologies has been opaque.175 The preeminent test adopted in their wake was articulated in Zippo Manufacturing
Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., decided in 1997 by the Western District of
Pennsylvania.176 Relying on Burger King, the Zippo court established a
sliding scale test for website activity and personal jurisdiction that assessed the commercial nature of a website in determining if purposeful
availment has occurred.177 When a website is simply passive—such as an
advertisement or informational site—no specific personal jurisdiction exists for claims arising out of the website.178 When a website is commercial, and allows consumers to enter into transactions or allows for the
repeated transmission of files over the internet, personal jurisdiction is
appropriate.179 Finally, when the website is in-between, i.e., interactive
but not necessarily commercial, the court will assess “the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs
on the [w]ebsite.”180 At the heart of this test is still purposeful availment—whether the defendant purposefully availed itself of the benefits
and protections of the forum’s laws, such that it should reasonably anticipate being haled into court in the forum.181
Zippo was an appropriate reaction to the early Web, when websites
were largely passive and items such as cookies, AI, and bots either did
not exist or were in very early stages.182 Further, courts struggled to understand when a website was actually interactive or passive.183 Courts examined a number of factors, from commercial activity,184 to ordering

process is aware that the final product is being marketed in the forum State, the possibility
of a lawsuit there cannot come as a surprise.” Id. at 117. However, the plurality opinion,
authored by Justice O’Connor, has seen more widespread adoption. Id. at 105–16.
175. See id. at 102; see also Burger King, 471 U.S. 462.
176. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997); see
Toys “R” Us v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 452 (“The opinion in [Zippo] has become a
seminal authority regarding personal jurisdiction based upon the operation of an Internet
web site.”).
177. Id. at 1124.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Shippitsa Ltd. v. Slack, No. 3:18-CV-1036-D, 2019 WL 2372687, at *4 (N.D. Tex.
June 5, 2019).
181. See Applied Food Scis., Inc. v. New Star 21, Inc., No. W–07–CA–359, 2009 WL
9120113, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2009).
182. See CIVIX-DDI LLC v. Microsoft Corp., No. 99-B-172, 1999 WL 1020248, at *2
(D. Colo. Oct. 1, 1999) (“The Internet may represent the latest and greatest challenge to
questions of personal jurisdiction.”). A typical website at the time of Zippo generally provided information about the defendant’s services—i.e., was essentially an advertisement.
See, e.g., Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620 (PKL)(AJP), 1997 WL 97097, at *15
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997).
183. See Food Scis. Corp. v. Nagler, No. 09–1798 (JBS), 2010 WL 1186203, at *2 (D.N.J.
Mar. 22, 2010).
184. See id. at *3–4.
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products without payment,185 to filling out forms,186 to ability to exchange information,187 to the ability to gather information or advertise,188
to accessibility,189 all while reaching somewhat inconsistent results. While
Zippo is outdated and confusing, it still remains the gold standard for an
online personal jurisdiction analysis.190
At least one modern jurisdictional area is clear regarding the position
of servers that host online websites.191 Courts have consistently held that
the physical location of a server is not de facto important in the specific
jurisdiction analysis; rather, what matters is what state the defendant is
“targeting” in accessing the server.192 Thus, courts will look to whether
defendants targeted residents of a certain state,193 communicated with a
state’s residents,194 or know that their targets were ultimately located in a
particular state.195 Additionally, courts will apply Zippo to the online
content itself but will not consider the physical location of the server that
hosts the site.196 For malicious attacks, it does not matter if the defendant
knowingly targeted the server at issue to steal data—in such cases, personal jurisdiction exists.197
185. See, e.g., ESAB Grp., Inc. v. Centricut, LLC, 34 F. Supp. 2d 323, 333–34 (D.S.C.
1999).
186. See, e.g., Zamora Radio, LLC v. Last.fm Ltd., No. 09-20940-CIV, 2011 WL
2580401, at *5 (S.D. Fla. June 28, 2011).
187. See Roblor Mktg. Grp. Inc., v. GPS Indus., Inc., 645 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1148–52
(S.D. Fla. 2009); see also Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 56 (D.D.C. 1998).
188. See Sweetgreen, Inc. v. Sweet Leaf, Inc., 882 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2012).
189. See, e.g., FC Inv. Grp. LC v. IFX Mkts., Ltd., 529 F.3d 1087, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
190. See Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620 (PKL)(AJP), 1997 WL 97097, at
*15 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997).
191. See Future World Elecs., LLC v. Results HQ, LLC, No. 17-17982, 2018 WL
2416682, at *3 (E.D. La. May 29, 2018).
192. See id. (“[A] plaintiff may not ‘rely on the fortuitous location’ of a server to establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant who accessed that server.” (quoting Chang v.
Virgin Mobile USA, LLC, No. 07-1767, 2009 WL 111570, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 2009)));
see also BGDG Enters., LLC v. Barley & Swine, No. A–13–CA–719–SS, 2014 WL
12479650, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2014) (noting that “courts have rejected the physical
location of servers as a basis for personal jurisdiction”).
193. See, e.g., Felland v. Clifton, 682 F.3d 665, 676 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding the consideration of the location of the computer server to be appropriate in a determination of specific jurisdiction where the defendant knew that he was sending correspondence to forum
residents); see also Abatix Corp. v. Capra, No. 2:07-CV-541, 2008 WL 4427285, at *4 (E.D.
Tex. Sept. 24, 2008) (finding the exercise of specific jurisdiction proper where nonresident
defendants “directed their allegedly tortious act” at computer servers located within the
forum).
194. See D.C. Micro Dev., Inc. v. Lange, 246 F. Supp. 2d 705, 712 (W.D. Ky. 2003); see
also Verizon Online Servs., Inc. v. Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d 601, 610 (E.D. Va. 2002) (finding
the exercise of personal jurisdiction was proper when defendant allegedly had “transmitted
millions of unsolicited commercial e-mails to and through [plaintiff’s] servers in [the forum
state]”).
195. MacDermid, Inc. v. Deiter, 702 F.3d 725, 730 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding personal jurisdiction over a former employee who knew the location of servers).
196. See, e.g., BGDG Enters., 2014 WL 12479650, at *4 (holding that, in a case arising
out of website contacts, physical location of a server does not matter in the Zippo analysis—to hold otherwise would be to “create new personal jurisdiction doctrines”).
197. See, e.g., Rhapsody Sols., LLC v. Cryogenic Vessel Alts., Inc., No. H–12–1168,
2013 WL 820589, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2013) (finding personal jurisdiction because evidence showed defendant knew of server location).
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Less clear in the case law is how specific jurisdiction is adapting to next
generation technologies, such as AI and bots. Bots are essentially
software programs with AI capabilities that allow them to independently
operate online.198 These bots can conduct transactions, create sub-agents,
and communicate with each other.199 Despite their widespread use, relatively little case law has established how bots are to be treated for personal jurisdiction purposes. In 2010, the District of Massachusetts
addressed a case involving the intersection of bots and personal jurisdiction in Jagex Limited v. Impulse Software.200 In Jagex, the plaintiff was
the owner of Runescape, an interactive computer game, and the defendants were developers of a software program called “iBot” that enabled
Runescape players to advance through the game without human participation.201 The iBot software functioned as follows:
The Bot software functions by downloading a copy of Runescape . . .
and using a process called “reflection” to examine the game’s internal operation which is normally hidden from users. The Bot software
uses this information to identify objects within the Runescape game
with which it wishes to interact and then completes a desired task
according to instructions from a script. In essence, the Bot plays the
game for its owner while she is away from her computer.202
The defendants sold iBot on websites that they operated for a profit.203
The plaintiff sued, alleging copyright infringement, trademark infringement, and violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.204 The court
was forced to consider whether personal jurisdiction in Massachusetts
was proper because defendants operated their websites from Florida.205
In considering specific jurisdiction, the court noted that the bots were
created in Florida and were then used in Massachusetts to violate Runescape’s Terms and Conditions.206 The court went on to use the 1999 Zippo
analysis to assess the quality of the commercial activity at issue, finding
that “the defendants operate[d] interactive websites that allow[ed] Massachusetts users to exchange payment information for software codes that
enable the bots to function.”207 Therefore, the court was concerned with
the exchange of payment for the bots on the interactive website, not the
operation of the bots themselves.208 It is entirely less clear what happens
198. See generally Denis T. Rice, Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Which Law and Forum
Apply to Securities Transactions on the Internet?, 21 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 585, 598
(2000).
199. Id.
200. 750 F. Supp. 2d 228, 231 (D. Mass. 2010).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 231–32.
206. Id. at 232.
207. Id. at 233.
208. Id. For a more concrete proposal involving bots directly, see Christopher B. Seaman, The Case Against Federalizing Trade Secrecy, 101 VA. L. REV. 317, 389 (2015) (articulating a national contacts standard for personal jurisdiction in trade secrets cases where
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when after a bot is released, it takes independent action to reach the forum and conducts activity that results in liability.209
III. MACHINE LEARNING AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Civil procedure has been somewhat slow to respond to changing technology—the Zippo test was developed in 1997, a time when Google did
not exist, there were only about 100,000 websites, and CD-RW drives
were being introduced.210 Civil procedure may not be ready for a world
in which AI and machine learning are the next big horizons.
The concept of AI has existed since World War II, during which time
computer scientist Alan Turing cracked the German “Enigma” code that
was used to send secure German messages during the war.211 To crack
Enigma, Turing and his team developed a machine that could learn to
decipher the Enigma messages.212 Turing developed what is still known as
the “Turing test”—if a machine could interact with humans, without
those humans knowing that they were conversing with a machine, the
machine was “intelligent.”213 This idea that a computer could fool its
questioner was dubbed the “imitation game.”214 Turing stated in his famous article, Computing Machinery and Intelligence:
bots are involved) (“Under a ‘national contacts’ standard, the misappropriator’s exploitation of compromised bots in different states could be aggregated to help establish personal
jurisdiction.”).
209. See Rice, supra note 198, at 598 (“The Web participant who unleashes a bot into a
digital environment, awash with other bots and virtual proxies, arguably leaves his geographical home, elects to transact in a different environment, and ceases to hold a reasonable belief that the laws or courts of his or her home jurisdiction will apply to the
transaction. This makes it necessary to consider new, non-geographical or less geographical
paradigms.”).
210. See The Web Back in 1996-1997, PINGDOM (Sept. 16, 2008), https://
royal.pingdom.com/the-web-in-1996-1997/ [https://perma.cc/PNE9-HPVG]; see also Computer History–1997, COMPUTER HOPE (May 6, 2020), https://www.computerhope.com/his
tory/1997.html [https://perma.cc/U8AH-LCBQ]. In contrast, there were over 1 billion websites in January 2019. How Many Websites Are There Around the World? [2020], MILL FOR
BUS. (Feb. 12, 2020), https://www.millforbusiness.com/how-many-websites-are-there/
[https://perma.cc/N8DC-7CNK].
211. Shaan Ray, History of AI, TOWARDS DATA SCI. (Aug. 11, 2018), https://towardsdatascience.com/history-of-ai-484a86fc16ef [https://perma.cc/R6GU-3H4G]. There is additional evidence that the concept of AI existed even long before the 1950s. Alex
Shashkevich, Stanford Researcher Examines Earliest Concepts of Artificial Intelligence, Robots in Ancient Myths, STANFORD NEWS (Feb. 28, 2019), https://news.stanford.edu/2019/02/
28/ancient-myths-reveal-early-fantasies-artificial-life/ [https://perma.cc/6TWX-243U]. Ancient Greeks first wrote about concepts that were like robotics through the god Talos, a
bronze statute that came to life to protect the island of Crete. Id. Even the novel Frankenstein, Mary Shelly’s famous novel about a reanimated corpse, suggests that humans have
long been interested in sparking intelligent life into inanimate objects. See Eileen Hunt
Botting, Godmother of Intelligences, AEON (Oct. 3, 2018), https://aeon.co/essays/whatfrankensteins-creature-can-really-tell-us-about-ai [https://perma.cc/SQ8T-LYAE].
212. See Ray, supra note 211 (demonstrating that Enigma and Bombe Machines have
laid foundations down for machine learning); see also Jason Griffey, Introduction, LIBR.
TECH. REPS., Jan. 2019, at 5–9; see also Or Shani, From Science Fiction to Reality: The
Evolution of Artificial Intelligence, WIRED, https://www.wired.com/insights/2015/01/theevolution-of-artificial-intelligence [https://perma.cc/TV2U-MSG4].
213. Ray, supra note 211.
214. Id.
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I propose to consider the question, “Can machines think?”
....
I believe that in about fifty years’ time it will be possible, to programme computers, with a storage capacity of about 109, to make
them play the imitation game so well that an average interrogator
will not have more than 70 per cent, chance of making the right identification after five minutes of questioning. The original question,
“Can machines think!” I believe to be too meaningless to deserve
discussion. Nevertheless I believe that at the end of the century the
use of words and general educated opinion will have altered so much
that one will be able to speak of machines thinking without expecting
to be contradicted. I believe further that no useful purpose is served
by concealing these beliefs. The popular view that scientists proceed
inexorably from well-established fact to well-established fact, never
being influenced by any unproved conjecture, is quite mistaken.215
The test operates as follows: Three entities, a human, a computer, and a
judge, are in play. The judge asks questions to the human and the computer, and the judge is forced to determine, based on tone and reaction, if
she is interrogating the human or the computer. In a two-person version
of test, the judge or interrogator grills its subject to determine if she is
talking to man or machine. The purpose of this test is to show that an
intelligent machine can replicate human behavior so perfectly that it is
ultimately indistinguishable from human intelligence.216
The test, however, raised larger issues about consciousness and intelligence.217 Commentators, and even Turing himself, noted that the test
would not capture whether the machine was truly conscious—it would be
possible for a program to pass the test without, for example, experiencing
emotion.218 However, as at least one author notes, “[t]his would be similar to how humans communicate to convince each other of what they are
feeling, though there is no guarantee that it is really true.”219 As such, the
Turing test is more about the human-facing side of the equation—does
the human judge feel that she is interacting with an intelligence, despite
what is going on inside the “black box” of the machine’s “mind.”220
A few years after Turing’s work, the human-facing component of AI
was already on the move—in 1952, a computer scientist developed a com215. A.M. Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 59 MIND: Q. REV. OF
PSYCHOL. & PHIL. 433, 422 (1950).
216. See id. at 433–34. Interestingly, an early example of a computer that satisfied the
so-called Turing test was “Engine”—the fictional machine portrayed by Jonathan Swift in
Gulliver’s Travels, published in the early 1700s. See Rebecca Reynoso, A Complete History
of Artificial Intelligence, G2 (Mar. 1, 2019), https://learn.g2.com/history-of-artificial-intelligence [https://perma.cc/E7RV-L5NN]. Engine used a non-human mechanical mind to improve knowledge and make mechanical operations more efficient. See id.
217. Reynoso, supra note 216.
218. MARIA JOHNSEN, THE FUTURE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN DIGITAL MARKETING 20 (2017).
219. Id.
220. Id. It is worth noting that no machine has yet been able to pass the Turing test,
suggesting that an increase in computation power since Turing’s day is not the sole limitation at play. Id.
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puter program that could learn to play checkers against a human opponent.221 Following this research, an American computer scientist
organized the Dartmouth Conference in 1956, which coined the term “artificial intelligence” and led to the first AI laboratory in 1959.222 Research
at this early juncture was centered around two camps—”good old-fashioned artificial intelligence” and the “artificial neural network” approach.223 Good old-fashioned artificial intelligence was based on logic
and used formal rules to manipulate symbols, while the artificial neural
networks were based on developing learning that mimicked the human
brain.224 Developments in these two camps in the 1950s and 1960s included the Lisp programming language (an innovation that created a programming language for AI research),225 Logic Theorist (the first AI
program that went on to prove 38/52 theorems in Prinicipa Mathematica),226 and the first humanoid robot that could converse with a human.227
Lisp was ultimately used to develop a program that could fully converse
in a human-psychologist interaction.228 While impressive, a majority of
221. See Reynoso, supra note 216 (“[T]he first to independently learn how to play a
game.”).
222. Shani, supra note 212 (“American cognitive scientist Marvin Minsky picked up the
AI torch and co-founded the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s AI laboratory in
1959, and he was one of the leading thinkers in the field through the 1960s and 1970s.”).
223. See generally Univ. of Queensl., History of Artificial Intelligence, QUEESL. BRAIN
INST., https://qbi.uq.edu.au/brain/intelligent-machines/history-artificial-intelligence [https://
perma.cc/7U8S-5CY6 ] (last updated Jan. 30, 2019).
224. See id.
225. See Reynoso, supra note 216 (explaining how a computer scientist created a program written in Lisp that solved algebra word problems).
226. Id.; Gil Press, A Very Short History of Artificial Intelligence (AI), FORBES (Dec. 30,
2016, 9:09 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/gilpress/2016/12/30/a-very-short-history-ofartificial-intelligence-ai/#6b490f26fba2 [perma.cc/J6EE-7DC4].
227. See Press, supra note 226 (“Wabot-2 is built at Waseda University in Japan, a musician humanoid robot able to communicate with a person, read a musical score and play
tunes of average difficulty on an electronic organ.”); see also Reynoso, supra note 216.
228. Reynoso, supra note 216 (“Joseph Weizenbaum, computer scientist and professor,
developed ELIZA, an interactive computer program that could functionally converse in
English with a person.”). The dialogue here was actually rather stunted. See Joseph Weizenbaum, Eliza/Doctor Program, UNIV. MD., https://www.cs.umd.edu/class/fall2012/
cmsc828d/oldreportfiles/guha1.pdf (July 3, 2020) [perma.cc/K5UL-3U36]. For example, the
program, named ELIZA, would introduce itself as a psychotherapist and ask the human to
describe issues they were facing. Id. For example:
HUMAN: I am unhappy.
ELIZA: Are you unhappy often?
HUMAN: Yes.
ELIZA: Can you elaborate on that?
HUMAN: Too much work.
ELIZA: Why do you say too much work?
HUMAN: I am working a lot.
ELIZA: Earlier you said you felt unhappy?
HUMAN: Yes.
ELIZA: I would appreciate it if you would continue.
HUMAN: Well, I don’t know what to do.
ELIZA: Maybe your plans have something to do with this.
HUMAN: No they don’t.
ELIZA: Go on, don’t be afraid.
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these developments were stifled by the limitations on computing.229
In the late 1990s, a renewed interest in AI occurred when IBM’s Deep
Blue program defeated Gary Kaparov, the world-reigning chess champion.230 The 1990s then saw a mass advance in the area of AI, including
“intelligent tutoring, case-based reasoning, multi-agent planning, scheduling, uncertain reasoning, data mining, natural language understanding
and translation, vision, virtual reality, games, and other topics.”231 The
2000s saw similar progress, with robots that could recognize and simulate
human emotions, autonomous driving, visual object recognition, and even
intelligent programs that would independently write sports stories for a
newspaper.232
Modern research into AI is based on the use of “deep learning,” an
approach centered on neural networks that learn from experience, much
like humans.233 Indeed, Turing himself first predicted this kind of deep
learning theory in Computing Machinery and Intelligence:
Instead of trying to produce a programme to simulate the adult
mind, why not rather try to produce one which simulates the child’s?
If this were then subjected to an appropriate course of education one
would obtain the adult brain. Presumably the child-brain is something like a note-book as one buys it from the stationers. Rather little
mechanism, and lots of blank sheets. (Mechanism and writing are
from our point of view almost synonymous.) Our hope is that there is
so little mechanism in the child-brain that something like it can be
easily programmed.234
In Turing’s view, it was more efficient to program a computer to learn
itself than to put forth a fully developed and pre-loaded “mind.”235 Today, deep learning is only possible thanks to modern computing technology, which can marshal huge amounts of data in a short amount of time
and utilize the achievements in storage and cloud computing to create
lightning-fast processing speeds.236 The use of massive data sets allows
Id. (names added for clarity). The researchers noted that people became emotionally attached to ELIZA, despite knowing that it was operating with a scripted code and did not
actually have human consciousness or experience with which to process their answers. See
id. Now, this phenomenon is called “the ‘ELIZA Effect’ which is the tendency of humans
to mistakenly confuse computer behaviours having intent behind them and draw analogies
to human behaviours subconsciously. Like ELIZA, humans start attributing emotion and
understanding to a programs output where none exist or is supposed to exist.” Id.
229. Weizenbaum, supra note 228.
230. Ray, supra note 211.
231. The Ass’n for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence, A Brief History of AI,
AITOPICS, https://aitopics.org/misc/brief-history [perma.cc/76NA-KUUQ] (noting that
these have been some of the significant demonstrations in machine learning).
232. See generally Press, supra note 226 (explaining the development of AI from 2000
to 2016 and the immense growth that occurred in those years).
233. See Univ. of Queensl., supra note 223.
234. Turing, supra note 215, at 456.
235. Id. at 454–60 (examining the question of whether a machine can think).
236. Univ. of Queensl., supra note 223 (“With enormous data sets, modern AI neural
networks can often exceed human performance in many tasks . . . .”).
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programs to learn through pattern recognition and experience.237
A. MACHINE LEARNING
Machine learning is different from artificial intelligence, but it is ultimately a subset of the same.238 Simply put, all machine learning is artificial intelligence, but not all artificial intelligence is machine learning.239
Artificial intelligence, as first described at the Dartmouth Conference in
1956, is the science of making intelligent machines, and it involves “any
sort of intelligence that doesn’t arise through natural processes, or where
intelligence can be understood to be created.”240 Artificial intelligence
can be analogized to human intelligence and can include tasks such as
object recognition, understanding and summarizing text, or speech
recognition.241
Good old-fashioned artificial intelligence is rule-based, meaning it uses
“if-then” statements or statistical models that are programmed by
humans.242 A computer playing chess, like IBM’s Deep Blue program, is
a product of this rule-based system.243 The Deep Blue program is criticized for not really being “intelligent” because it does not use its own
independent learning or experiences.244 Rather, it uses a pre-programmed set of rules to arrive at an outcome.245 The program uses an evaluation to score the state of the chess board. For example, a maximum
evaluation score would be given to a board position where the computer
has the other player in a checkmate position.246 An algorithm assesses
which action minimizes the maximum possible loss—a Minimax algorithm247—and looks as many steps into the future as possible using the
available computing power to calculate possible reactions by the oppo237. See id.
238. See Lithmee, Difference Between Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence, DIFFERENCE BETWEEN.COM (Jan. 20, 2018), https://www.differencebetween.com/differencebetween-machine-learning-and-vs-artificial-intelligence/ [perma.cc/76CX-222K] (“Machine
Learning is a type of Artificial Intelligence that gives the ability for a computer to learn
without being explicitly programmed[,] and Artificial Intelligence is the theory and development of computer systems able to perform tasks intelligently similar to a human.”).
239. Chris Nicholson, Artificial Intelligence (AI) vs. Machine Learning vs. Deep Learning, PATHMIND, https://pathmind.com/wiki/ai-vs-machine-learning-vs-deep-learning [https:/
/perma.cc/7YUY-VER7].
240. Griffey, supra note 212, at 6.
241. Id.
242. See Nicholson, supra note 239 (“The if-then statements are simply rules explicitly
programmed by a human hand.”).
243. See generally Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa.
1997).
244. See Jesse Emspak, What is Intelligence? 20 Years After Deep Blue, AI Still Can’t
Think Like Humans, LIVE SCIENCE (May 11, 2017), https://www.livescience.com/59068deep-blue-beats-kasparov-progress-of-ai.html [perma.cc/F3TD-WUG6] (explaining how
machines can still fall short in certain areas).
245. Nicholson, supra note 239.
246. See Algorithms—Minimax, STRATEGIES & TACTICS FOR INTELLIGENT SEARCH,
https://cs.stanford.edu/people/eroberts/courses/soco/projects/2003-04/intelligent-search/
minimax.html [https://perma.cc/GGG8-ZSNK].
247. See id.
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nent to minimize the loss that the opponent could inflict down the
road.248 But it is ultimately based on pre-programmed rules entered by
humans, and the concern is more about whether the output mimics a response that an intelligent human could produce.249
In contrast, the new generation of AI has focused on the sub-field of
machine learning.250 The heart of machine learning is dynamic adjustments, meaning that the program does not require human involvement to
make changes.251 Rather, it modifies and adapts itself when exposed to
new information, essentially programming on its own to modify its outputs.252 This loosely mimics the child brain that Turing explored in the
early 1950s—like a human child, programs equipped with machine learning adjust based on experience and new information.253 Of course, the
question of machine learning is closely tied with the question of whether
human-level intelligence and autonomy can ever be achieved by a machine—the type of learning that autonomously grows and builds on itself.254 As Turing noted, humans process experiences through a gradual
development that focuses on learning from instructions, past experience,
mistakes, and the use of images.255
These modalities are difficult for a computer to master, even at the
level of sheer processing power.256 The human mind has close to 100 billion neural cells and might be engaged in 200 trillion operations in any
248. See id.
249. See Harry Surden, Machine Learning and Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87, 95–96 (2014)
(“This is an outcome-oriented view of intelligence—assessing based upon whether the results that were produced were sensible and useful—rather than whether the underlying
process that produced them was ‘cognitive’ in nature.”).
250. Rachel Wilka et al., How Machines Learn: Where Do Companies Get Data for
Machine Learning and What Licenses Do They Need?, 13 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 217,
219 (2018) (“Real world utilization of machine learning increases daily, as more and more
companies use the technology . . . .”).
251. See generally STUART J. RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A
MODERN APPROACH 693 (3d ed. 2010). See also Nicholson, supra note 242 (“[L]ike a child
that is born knowing nothing adjusts its understanding of the world in response to
experience.”).
252. Nicholson, supra note 239 (noting that an early pioneer of machine learning stated
that it was the “‘field of study that gives computers the ability to learn without being explicitly programmed’”); see Weston Kowert, Note, The Foreseeability of Human-Artificial
Intelligence Interactions, 96 TEX. L. REV. 181, 183 (2017) (“[T]he software evolves over
time.”).
253. Kowert, supra note 252, at 183 (“A new artificial intelligence software is not unlike
the brain of a human child—ready to be molded and shaped by its experiences.”).
254. See Nicholson, supra note 239 (noting that machine learning is dynamic and does
not require human intervention in order to make changes).
255. See generally Chris Smith et al., The History of Artificial Intelligence (Dec. 2006)
(unpublished student work, University of Washington), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/
0855/99650ebfcfba0dcb434bc50b7c7c54fdbf05.pdf?_ga=2.43880549.173453547.1564071020487250006.1564071020 [https://perma.cc/VKB2-YF9Z].
256. Maciamo Hay, Could a Machine or an AI Ever Feel Human-Like Emotions?,
VITAMODULARIS (Apr. 22, 2014), https://www.vitamodularis.org/articles/could_a_machine
_feel_human-like_emotions.shtml [https://perma.cc/JA4B-4GM4] (“Just like machines cannot reasonably feel hunger because they do not eat, replicating emotions on machines with
no biological body, no hormones, and no physiological needs can be tricky.”).
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given second.257 Further, machines are still driven by logic rules, which
fail to emulate the way the human mind actually thinks—by using images
rather than rigid rule-based reasoning.258 Hubert Dreyfus described the
problem as follows: if people know that a small box is resting on a large
box, they can imagine what would happen if the large box were removed,
but a program “must be given a list of facts about boxes, such as their
size, weight, and frictional coefficients, as well as information about how
each is affected by various kinds of movements.”259 Despite these limitations, machine learning has proven possible, at least in a way that focuses
on using datasets to achieve accurate predictions about future results.260
The concept of machine learning breaks down into goals or dimensions
for a system—minimizing loss and accomplishing the objective function.261 These are first played out in a historical dataset used to train the
algorithm to make predictions.262 The objective tells us mathematically
what the program is trying to accomplish, i.e., the function that it is designed to maximize and minimize.263 The loss function is how learning
occurs—by evaluating how well algorithms actually model the given
data.264 When a prediction and the actual results deviate in too great a
way, the loss function produces a high number that the machine then attempts to reduce through the application of refined rules.265 For example,
257. Anicia Ndabahaliye, Number of Neurons in a Human Brain, PHYSICS FACTBOOK
(2002), https://hypertextbook.com/facts/2002/AniciaNdabahaliye2.shtml [https://perma.cc/
EDD9-PV9H].
258. See Hay, supra note 256 (“Research in artificial intelligence (AI) suggests that
intelligent machines will eventually be able to see, hear, smell, sense, move, think, create
and speak at least as well as humans.”).
259. Hubert Dreyfus & Stuart Dreyfus, Why Computers May Never Think Like People,
in READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY 375, 382 (David M. Kaplan ed., 2nd ed.
2009).
260. Surden, supra note 249, at 89 (“[T]he idea that the computers are ‘learning’ is
largely a metaphor and does not imply that computers systems are artificially replicating
the advanced cognitive systems thought to be involved in human learning. Rather, we can
consider these algorithms to be learning in a functional sense: they are capable of changing
their behavior to enhance their performance on some task through experience.” (footnote
omitted)).
261. See generally RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 251, at 693.
262. Ray, supra note 211 (“In the 1960s, researchers emphasized developing algorithms
to solve mathematical problems and geometrical theorems.”).
263. See Nicholson, supra note 239; see also Nick McCrea, An Introduction to Machine
Learning Theory and Its Applications: A Visual Tutorial with Examples, TOPTAL, https://
www.toptal.com/machine-learning/machine-learning-theory-an-introductory-primer
[perma.cc/J3Q6-FV2E] (“Examples of machine learning problems include, ‘Is this cancer?’, ‘What is the market value of this house?’, ‘Which of these people are good friends
with each other?’, ‘Will this rocket engine explode on take off?’, ‘Will this person like this
movie?’ . . . .”); see, e.g., Xavier Amatriain & Justin Basilico, Netflix Recommendations:
Beyond the 5 starts (Part 1), NETFLIX TECH BLOG (Apr. 6, 2012), https://netflixtechblog.com/netflix-recommendations-beyond-the-5-stars-part-1-55838468f429 [perma.cc/
H3GT-DUH5].
264. McCrea, supra note 263.
265. Id.; see RUSSELL D. REED & ROBERT J. MARKS II, NEURAL SMITHING: SUPERVISED LEARNING IN FEEDFORWARD ARTIFICIAL NEURAL NETWORKS, 155 (1999) (noting
that the loss function “reduces all the various good and bad aspects of a possibly complex
system down to a single number, a scalar value, which allows candidate solutions to be
ranked and compared”).
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if we predict that 254 students will enter as first-year students at a given
law school in a given year, and 254 students enroll, our loss is zero. In
contrast, if we predict that 254 students will enroll, and 354 students ultimately comprise the first-year class, our loss is 100. The same loss is
achieved if only 154 students enroll. We could utilize mean square error
as the loss function for this data set—the formula will assess the loss between the algorithm’s predictions and the real values, square it, and then
average across the data set to determine if the algorithm has appropriately minimized loss.266
The goal of machine learning is for the program to adjust algorithms to
minimize the loss as much as possible.267 The system is thus entirely
about optimization that continues until the system cannot achieve any
lower rate of error.268 If we want to use machine learning to predict law
school enrollment, we will use previous data sets to train an algorithm
that will then attempt to predict future enrollment based on new data.269
Perhaps one of the reasons that machine learning has gained so much
traction is that, for the first time, huge data sets are actually available.270
In the example above, we could not successfully predict law school enrollment based on just previous years and the number of students that enrolled—i.e., 240 students enrolled in 2015, 238 enrolled in 2014.271
Rather, we would want a data set that encompasses a variety of factors,
including market conditions, available jobs in the legal sector, national or
regional rates of college graduation, number of students that visited campus for an admissions presentation, number of students sitting nationally
and regionally for the LSAT, etc.272 Only with all of these data sets, going
back for some period of time, would a predictive algorithm be able to
train to achieve useful predictions about the future.273
Around this premise, three types of machine learning have emerged:
supervised, unsupervised, and reinforcement.274 Supervised learning is
266. Jason Brownlee, Loss and Loss Functions for Training Deep Learning Neural Networks, MACHINE LEARNING MASTERY (Jan. 28, 2019), https://machinelearningmastery.com/loss-and-loss-functions-for-training-deep-learning-neural-networks/ [perma.cc/
TH5G-7BFX] (“The cost or loss function has an important job in that it must faithfully
distill all aspects of the model down into a single number in such a way that improvements
in that number are a sign of a better model.”).
267. Id.
268. See generally Nicholson, supra note 239.
269. Surden, supra note 249, at 105–06.
270. Id. at 100.
271. See id. at 106 (“In general, machine learning algorithms are only as good as the
data that they are given to analyze. These algorithms build internal statistical models based
upon the data provided.”). In this example, the year alone doesn’t help us predict enrollment, as there is nothing magical about the arrangement of four numbers that drives students to attend law school.
272. See id. at 92.
273. Id. (“[A]n algorithm will need data with many hundreds or thousands examples of
the relevant phenomenon in order to produce a useful internal model (i.e. robust set of
predictive computer rules).”).
274. See generally Karen Hao, The Rare Form of Machine Learning That Can Spot
Hackers Who Have Already Broken in, MIT TECH. REV. (Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.tech
nologyreview.com/s/612427/the-rare-form-of-machine-learning-that-can-spot-hackers-who-
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currently the most prevalent and involves data that is labeled to tell the
program the type of pattern it should be searching in a pre-populated
training dataset.275 In supervised learning, the creators feed the program
the labeled data and train it to recognize patterns within the confines of
those labels—i.e., these are pictures of human faces, and these are not.276
Eventually, the program will be able to recognize human faces and adjust
itself when it makes mistakes.277 At the heart of supervised learning are
two different techniques: classification and regression.278 Classification
techniques are those that classify data into categories, such as speech recognition,279 and “[r]egression techniquies predict continuous responses[,
such as] changes in temperature or fluctuations in power demand.”280
In contrast, unsupervised learning allows the program to see what patterns it can find in a training dataset on its own.281 Clustering is a primary
activity in unsupervised machine learning,282 where the program identifies groupings and clusters like patterns together.283 This is less popular
but has an interesting application in cybersecurity.284 Programmers can
give the program access to large unlabeled data sets and allow the program to identify what doesn’t match typical patterns in the set.285 This
allows programs to identify hacking techniques that have not previously
been seen before because they do not follow typical set patterns.286
The last type of machine learning is reinforcement learning, which involves a system being rewarded or penalized as it attempts to reach its
objective.287 Essentially, the training set of known data provided in the
supervised learning context is gone.288 Rather, the program must use trial
and error methods to arrive at a solution to the objective, and it receives
have-already-broken-in/ [https://perma.cc/M3L8-THPN] (demonstrating supervised learning involves giving the machine massive amounts of data to train it to recognize a defined
pattern).
275. See Karen Hao, What is Machine Learning?, MIT TECH. REV. (Nov. 17, 2018),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612437/what-is-machine-learning-we-drew-you-another-flowchart/ [https://perma.cc/382J-5XN6]; see also Wilka et al., supra note 250, at 222.
276. See Hao, supra note 274 (explaining this with an example of the recognition of
golden retrievers).
277. See id.
278. McCrea, supra note 263.
279. What is Machine Learning?, MATHWORKS, https://www.mathworks.com/discovery/
machine-learning.html [https://perma.cc/73UG-RBJ2] (“[F]or example, whether an email is
genuine or spam, or whether a tumor is cancerous or benign.”).
280. Id.
281. Id. (showing how “clustering” is used for exploratory data analysis to find hidden
patterns or groupings in data).
282. Id.
283. See Bernard Marr, Supervised V Unsupervised Machine Learning—What’s The
Difference?, FORBES (Mar. 16, 2017, 3:13 AM) https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/
2017/03/16/supervised-v-unsupervised-machine-learning-whats-the-difference/
#4ecd3f80485d [perma.cc/L5B9-ZRUN].
284. See Hao, supra note 274.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Hao, supra note 275.
288. Id.
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numerical rewards or penalties along the way as feedback.289 The best
example of reinforcement learning is from driverless cars.290 The algorithms that underly autonomous driving conduct thousands of test miles
and track errors and successes to maximize the success of the algorithms
in interacting with the environment.291 Although relatively new, reinforcement learning is likely to grow in influence.292
B. MACHINE LEARNING

IN

ACTION

Whether one knows it or not, we interact with machine learning every
single day, and most major companies are using it to drive business and
innovation.293 An easy example is an e-mail spam filter.294 The program
at the heart of the spam filter comes with pre-programmed rules entered
by the programmer to move spam e-mails that either come from a certain
type of e-mail address or have certain characteristics, like a low image to
text ratio.295 However, as an individual reacts to the e-mails that are flagged as spam—reading them or deleting them—the program adjusts itself
on how to respond to that type of message in the future.296 If a user always deletes e-mails from their mother, or from a certain country, or with
a certain subject line, the system will start moving those types of e-mail to
the spam folder.297 Recommendations on Netflix,298 or ads on Google or
289. Id.
290. Wilka et al., supra note 250, at 224–25.
291. Id. at 225.
292. Elizabeth Fuzaylova, Note, War Torts, Autonomous Weapon Systems, and Liability: Why A Limited Strict Liability Tort Regime Should Be Implemented, 40 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1327, 1349 (2019) (“While reinforcement learning in AI machines is still in relatively
early stages of development, it will eventually become sophisticated and prevalent across
many AI machines . . . .”).
293. Id. at 1334 (“Today, nearly every major technology company, including IBM,
Microsoft, Google, and Facebook, has laboratories specifically dedicated to AI research
and development.”); Warren E. Agin, A Simple Guide to Machine Learning, A.B.A. BUS.
L. (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/science_technology/publications/
scitech_lawyer/2017/fall/simple-guide-machine-learning/ [https://perma.cc/4TSD-8MKY]
(“[I]n reality machine learning techniques are in broad use today.”). Indeed, machine
learning helped produce this Article. See id. Both “Westlaw and Lexis use machine learning . . . in their natural-language search . . . features.” Id.
294. See Joe Anslinger, How Do Email Spam Filters Work?, LIEBERMAN TECHS. (Nov.
12, 2013), https://www.ltnow.com/email-spam-filters-work/ [perma.cc/NCB7-698G] (“Unsolicited commercial email (UCE) is the digital junk mail known as spam.”).
295. See Luke Dormehl, What The Heck is Machine Learning, and Why is it Everywhere
These Days?, DIGITAL TRENDS: EMERGING TECH (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.digitaltrends
.com/cool-tech/what-is-machine-learning-beginners-guide/ [perma.cc/GG2L-JPF7] (“A
rule that filters out emails with a low ratio of image to text isn’t so useful if you’re a graphic
designer, who is likely to receive lots of useful emails that meet these parameters.”).
296. Id.
297. See generally Anslinger, supra note 294 (demonstrating the multiple types of spam
filters, such as content filters, header filters, general blacklist filters, rules-based filters,
permission filters, and challenge-response filters).
298. Netflix actually crowd sourced its machine learning and data mining system for
movie recommendations. Amatriain & Basilico, supra note 263. In 2006, it announced a $1
million prize to anyone who could improve the accuracy of its recommendation matching
system by 10%. Id. The first “Progress Prize” was given to a team that spent 2,000 hours
coming up with 107 algorithms that improved accuracy by 8.43%. Id.
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Facebook, are other examples of machine learning in action.299 The programs in these systems gather as much data as possible to determine what
content or suggestions a user would be most likely to respond to and then
adjust their algorithms based on the user’s reaction.300 This is essentially
pattern recognition in a manner that is designed to minimize error over
time.301
Machine learning has infiltrated additional aspects of our lives:302
• Image recognition, including face recognition that allows the tagging of photos on social media, or recognition of images on the web
• Speech recognition, including the conversion of audio to text, such
as occurs on your cell phone
• Web search engines, which use machine learning algorithms to rank
the relevancy of pages
• Spam detection
• Banking and financial services
• Weather forecasting
• Autonomous driving
• Handwriting recognition
• Traffic predictions
• Medical diagnosis
Among the more concerning types of machine learning applications are
those that involve “social bots” or “chatbots.”303 Bots are some of the
earliest inhabitants of the internet and are programs that operate online
to engage in a number of functions.304 For example, bots can carry internet content to mobile applications, index websites to produce better
search results, extract data, or monitor website performance.305 Chatbots
are a subset of bots, which can utilize machine learning to simulate
human conversation and interact with humans online or on social media
299. See How Does Google Ads Work?, ADESPRESSO, https://adespresso.com/guides/
google-ads-beginners/how-it-works/ [https://perma.cc/XAE5-7HQX] (examining the different types of advertising options for Google based on the search network and the sisplay
network).
300. Hao, supra note 275.
301. See id.
302. See Nathan Sinnott, How Machine Learning Is Changing the World – and Your
Everyday Life, ENTREPRENEUR (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/
312016 [https://perma.cc/J4YV-WKZG] (demonstrating how machine learning has affected
work life such as: education, law, skilled and manual labor, health, transport, and home
life).
303. Thomas Wieberneit, Why AI, Machine Learning, and Bots? Better Experiences.,
CUSTOMERTHINK (Jan. 19, 2017), https://customerthink.com/why-ai-machine-learning-andbots-better-experiences/ [perma.cc/6ZBH-LX6G] (“Bots are an application—an application being most helpful if it is based upon a minimal level of (artificial) intelligence, and
that particularly serves interaction purposes.”).
304. See generally Emilio Ferrara et al., The Rise of Social Bots, 59 COMM. ACM 96, 96
(2016) https://doi.org/10.1145/2818717 [https://perma.cc/SS53-K3UL].
305. See Igal Zeifman, Bot Traffic Report 2016, IMPERVA (Jan. 24, 2017), https://
www.imperva.com/blog/bot-traffic-report-2016/ [https://perma.cc/4KB9-F26C].
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platforms.306 Chatbots, like all forms of human-computer conversational
interaction, use dialogue datasets to predict the appropriate response to
human input.307
In recent years, the most concerning type of bot operating on the Web
is the social bot, a “computer algorithm that automatically produces content and interacts with humans on social media, trying to emulate and
possibly alter their behavior.”308 Sometimes these bots are benign, in that
they produce automatic responses to consumer inquiries.309 However, social bots can also spread false information or unverified rumors by automatically sharing and re-tweeting information without concern as to its
accuracy.310 Going further, social bots can be designed to exploit and
change the direction of social media discussions, smear political candidates, and create fake news.311 Indeed, thanks to machine learning
[t]he boundary between human-like and bot-like behavior is now
fuzzier. For example, social bots can search the Web for information
and media to fill their profiles, and post collected material at predetermined times, emulating the human temporal signature of content
production and consumption—including circadian patterns of daily
activity and temporal spikes of information generation. They can
even engage in more complex types of interactions, such as entertaining conversations with other people, commenting on their posts,
and answering their questions.312
Certainly not all bots are bad. In a twenty-first century update on
ELIZA (the early computer program designed to mimic a psychotherapist), Stanford scientists developed “Woebot,” a chatbot therapist that
can engage in conversation, supply helpful videos, and help with mood
tracking using cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) principles.313 Interestingly, the Journal of World Psychiatry reported that internet-delivered
CBT, like Woebot, may be equivalent in results to traditional in-person
306. Voxpro, AI, Machine Learning and Bots—What’s It All About?, MEDIUM, https://
medium.com/@Voxpro/ai-machine-learning-and-bots-whats-it-all-about-5dbb6cd3adee
[https://perma.cc/2BJ5-PE8A] (“A . . . ‘chatbot’ . . . is computer proram that simulates
human conversation, or chat, through artificial intelligence.”).
307. Id.
308. Ferrara et al., supra note 304, at 96.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 98 (noting that “this kind of abuse has already been observed: during the
2010 U.S. midterm elections, social bots were employed to support some candidates and
smear their opponents, injecting thousands of tweets pointing to websites with fake news”).
312. Id. at 99 (footnote omitted).
313. See Justin Lee, How Chatbots Use AI, Machine Learning and NLP to Transform
Marketing and Sales, GROWTHBOT (June 12, 2018, 11:24 AM), https://blog.growthbot.org/
how-chatbots-use-ai-machine-learning-and-nlp-to-transform-marketing-and-sales [https://
perma.cc/2CUR-YZA4]; see also Arun Rao, Woebot—Your AI Cognitive Behavioral Therapist: An Interview with Alison Darcy, MEDIUM: CHATBOTS MAG. (Jan. 22, 2018), https://
chatbotsmagazine.com/woebot-your-ai-cognitive-behavioral-therapist-an-interview-withalison-darcy-b69ac238af45 [https://perma.cc/Z2HV-JSQF] (“Currently Woebot sends 2 million messages a week to users in over 135 countries across the globe. I estimate Woebot has
a few hundred thousand monthly active users (MAUs) in early 2018.”).
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CBT.314 Bots are also used in the hiring process.315 For example, a bot
like “Mya” can interview job candidates to ask them about basic requirements for open positions.316 As bots continue to interact with the world,
and as they become more autonomous in doing so, real questions remain
about liability as a result of their artificial, but still very consequential,
actions.317
IV. THE NEW CIVIL PROCEDURE
The question of AI or machine learning operators has been explored
largely in terms of liability—Who can be sued in a world where AI is
operating on its own?318 However, this paper seeks to begin an answer to
a different question—How do we sue in a world where AI is operating on
its own? Almost no case law exists to guide the answer.319
In answering this question there is a distinction between autonomous
and semi-autonomous AI systems.320 In a semi-autonomous AI system, a
human can still override the operation of the machine.321 In contrast, an
autonomous AI system makes decisions entirely on its own, independent
of human instruction.322 An example of an autonomous AI system comes
in the form of driverless vehicles.323 There, it is the AI system that is
making snap decisions in response to new stimuli.324
The most concerning aspect, especially for autonomous systems, is the
inherent unpredictability of a system that can learn on its own and adapt
outside of human control.325 The programmer who releases an AI may
314. Gerhard Andersson et al., Guided Internet-Based vs. Face-to-Face Cognitive Behavior Therapy for Psychiatric and Somatic Disorders: A Systematic Review and MetaAnalysis, 13 WORLD PSYCHIATRY 288, 288 (2014).
315. See generally McKenzie Raub, Comment, Bots, Bias and Big Data: Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Bias and Disparate Impact Liability in Hiring Practices, 71 ARK. L.
REV. 529, 537 (2018).
316. Id.
317. See Matthew O. Wagner, You Can’t Sue a Robot: Are Existing Tort Theories Ready
for Artifical Intelligence? (Part 3 of 3), FROST BROWN TODD (Feb. 7, 2018), https://frostbrowntodd.com/you-cant-sue-a-robot-are-existing-tort-theories-ready-for-artificial-intelligence/ [https://perma.cc/K9Y4-FD6E] (examining the possibility of legal consequences and
theories that could be used against AI or its maker as AI becomes more sophisticated).
318. A plethora of papers look at whether the AI can be sued on its own or whether its
creator can be sued for the underlying liability.
319. One of the only published cases discussing jurisdiction in the context of AI is Hendricks v. United States, 140 Fed. Cl. 496, 499 (2018), which held that there was no Tucker
Act jurisdiction when an arrestee alleged that an AI stole his thoughts.
320. Fuzaylova, supra note 292, at 1342.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. See David C. Vladeck, Machines Without Principals: Liability Rules and Artificial
Intelligence, 89 WASH. L. REV. 117, 125 (2014) (“The first truly autonomous artificial intelligence devices that may test the adequacy of current liability rules may be cars designed to
be driver-less, or at least to give human drivers the option to let the car drive itself.”).
324. Id. at 125–26.
325. Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges,
Competencies, and Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353, 367 (2016) (“Loss of control can
be broken down into two varieties. A loss of local control occurs when the AI system can
no longer be controlled by the human or humans legally responsible for its operation and
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not be fully aware of the decisions that the AI will make, and the
programmer ultimately loses control over the outputs.326 Indeed, examples abound of crafty or dangerous AIs that have the potential to cause
mayhem.327 In 2012, programmers noticed that their program had
learned, on its own, to “cheat” at its assigned task, thus purposefully fooling the researchers who had built it.328 Even more concerning is the AI
technology GPT-2, which learns patterns in language and then generates
full-length paragraphs that mimic the provided writing style.329 The program has the capacity to create news articles that look so real that many
would not be able to tell that the writer was not human.330 For example,
after being given a few sentences about Brexit, GPT-2 created a fully
believable and entirely artificial article that generated fake quotes using
real names.331 The company that hosted the program refused to release it,
citing concerns about its possible misuse.332
These examples highlight the fact that machine learning has the potential to be dangerous and to create liability.333 The question is, What does
the new civil procedure—particularly service of process and personal jurisdiction—look like in response? This paper seeks to answer those questions by looking to the core of both doctrines.
A. SERVICE

OF

PROCESS

There are two components of machine learning that have the capacity
to change service of process: first, the ability to locate defendants through
machine learning platforms, and second, a change in how we view notice
reasonably calculated to apprise a defendant of the pendency of a lawsuit,
especially with regards to what constitutes ordinary diligence in choosing
a method of service.
The heart of the American service of process doctrine is Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., which is based on the principle of
supervision. A loss of general control occurs when the AI system can no longer be controlled by any human. Obviously, the latter prospect presents far greater public risk than
the former, but even a loss of general control would not necessarily pose significant public
risk as long as the objectives of the AI system align with those of the public at large.”
(emphasis omitted)).
326. See id.
327. See generally Devin Coldewey, This Clever AI Hid Data from Its Creators to Cheat
at Its Appointed Task, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 31, 2018 5:14 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/
12/31/this-clever-ai-hid-data-from-its-creators-to-cheat-at-its-appointed-task/ [https://
perma.cc/37KY-339K].
328. Id. (“[The program] was found to be cheating by hiding information it would need
later in a nearly imperceptible, high frequency signal.” (internal quotation omitted)).
329. See Betsy Mikel, This A.I. Bot Can Convincingly ‘Write’ Entire Articles. It’s So
Dangerously Good, the Creators Are Scared to Release It, INC. (Feb. 23, 2019), https://
www.inc.com/betsy-mikel/elon-musks-ai-nonprofit-just-made-a-truly-alarming-announcement-it-raises-serious-flags-about-future-of-fake-news.html [https://perma.cc/7BGGSWDF].
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id.
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adequate notice under the circumstances.334 Mullane requires notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections.335 The Mullane Court famously stated that “[a]n
elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under
all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the
action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”336
The holding in Mullane has long been called upon to deal with situations where the circumstances are such that the defendant cannot receive
actual notice of the lawsuit.337 In such situations, courts are concerned
with protecting the defendant’s constitutional interest in something
equivalent to personal notice.338 Therefore, courts primarily appear to
reason by analogy—How close is what’s offered to the guarantees of the
gold standard of actual, personal service?339
However, Mullane itself requires no such thing as a bright line. In examining the language of Mullane, its standard appears to have (1) a
knowledge component and (2) a timing component.340 As to knowledge,
the defendant must be given such notice as to ensure that the defendant
has the necessary information needed to respond to the lawsuit.341 As to
timing, the notice must give adequate time for the defendant to prepare a
response.342 But Mullane was not draconian. The opinion itself allowed
for service in a publication for impacted parties whose contact information could not be easily identified.343
This portion of Mullane is particularly relevant for a discussion of machine learning with regard to service of process.344 In Mullane, the defendant bank had the contact information for some category of the
beneficiaries impacted by its management of a common trust, but it did
not have the contact information for all of the beneficiaries to the underlying smaller trusts.345 Notice by mail was considered appropriate for the
334. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). “For more
than fifty years, the Mullane case has provided the definitive constitutional framework for
notice.” Aaron R. Chacker, E-Ffectuating Notice: Rio Properties v. Rio International Interlink, 48 VILL. L. REV. 597, 604 (2003).
335. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
336. Id. at 314–15.
337. Id. at 315.
338. Id. at 319.
339. Both Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 445 (1982), and Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S.
220, 238 (2006), require the plaintiff to achieve something as close as possible to actual
notice, even when the original method of attempting service was otherwise reasonable.
340. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314–15.
341. Id. at 314.
342. Id. at 315.
343. Id. at 317–18.
344. See generally id.
345. The Bank at issue in Mullane established a common trust and needed court approval for settlement of the trust. Id. at 309. A large number of smaller trusts (113) were to
be added to the pool, and the total number of trust beneficiaries at issue was uncertain. Id.
Contact information was available for some beneficiaries but not for all. Id.

2020]

Machine Learning

533

beneficiaries that the bank knew and for which the bank had contact information, but the unknown beneficiaries could be served simply by publication in a newspaper, a form unlikely to result in any actual notice.346
The Court was pointed in noting that its measures involved only “ordinary standards of diligence” and that such diligence would be guided by
context.347
Ordinary standards of diligence may take on a new meaning in a world
populated with machine learning. First, it appears clear that online communication and presence is becoming much more common than traditional modalities of service, such as mail and newspaper publication.348
But even if we do not move to aggressively recognize electronic service or
service by social media, machine learning may still be able to assist in
providing the best possible notice in any circumstance.349 The major advantage of machine learning algorithms is that they can sort through huge
data sets quickly, and they can comb the Web for additional information.350 As these datasets become more widely available, the definition of
ordinary diligence may change.351 Plaintiffs struggling to locate defendants may have more options than before to locate mailing addresses, active social media accounts, and other indications of a defendant’s
location.352
At its heart, the Mullane standard is premised on flexibility.353 Stripped
to its essence, it allows a court to look at societal context and available
technology in deciding what counts as appropriate service under the circumstances.354 Therefore, while courts should probably accept that online
platforms and social media are now appropriate vehicles for service in
modern times, the coming tide of machine learning might actually impose
greater diligence requirements on plaintiffs.355 With access to these tools,
a plaintiff might have more ability than before to gain accurate information about a defendant’s online and physical presence.356 Indeed, Mullane
should survive the coming storm, even though it may be bolstered with
additional tools to meet its requirements.357
346. Id. at 318.
347. Id. at 317.
348. See Christopher M. Finke, Comment, Friends, Followers, Connections, Lend Me
Your Ears: A New Test for Determining the Sufficiency of Service of Process Via Social
Media, 46 U. BALT. L. REV. 139, 155 (2016).
349. See id. at 155–56.
350. Gavin Edwards, Machine Learning: An Introduction, TOWARDS DATA SCI. (Nov.
18, 2018), https://towardsdatascience.com/machine-learning-an-introduction-23b84d51e6d0
[https://perma.cc/L3X5-LLZV].
351. See Finke, supra note 348, at 155.
352. Edwards, supra note 350.
353. See generally Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 306 (1950).
354. See generally id.
355. See Sexton, supra note 89 (examining some of the pitfalls to service by social
media).
356. Edwards, supra note 350.
357. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315.
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B. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Unlike service of process, personal jurisdiction will need to be adjusted
to machine learning applications, particularly in core considerations of
purposeful availment. Over time, the personal jurisdiction doctrine has
clung to one vital fundamental—that the defendant did something to purposefully avail itself of the forum state.358 This inquiry touches two essential points: (1) that the defendant should expect to be sued in the forum
state, and (2) that the defendant took advantage of the benefits of the
forum state, including its laws and protections.359 These themes exist in
both specific and general jurisdiction.360 But each is impacted by a world
in which non-physical programs can take independent actions.361
The first prong of purposeful availment is that the defendant foresees,
because of its actions, being haled into court in the forum state.362 The
purpose of this inquiry is to ensure that the defendant can structure its
behavior to avoid risk.363 If the defendant does not want to risk suit in a
forum, it should be able to take actions to avoid that forum.364 In contrast, if a defendant is operating in a forum, creating a relationship with
the forum, or gaining a benefit from the forum, it should not shock the
defendant to be called into court for activities in the forum.365 This prevents the defendant from being sued on random, fortuitous, or attenuated
contacts in a particular state.366 For example, courts have long held that
merely exchanging telephone calls or letters in the forum state is too attenuated to create foreseeability and thus is not purposeful availment.367
This relates closely to the second prong of purposeful availment—that
the defendant takes advantages of the benefits and protections of the forum state.368 In a sense, this asks whether the defendant “cloaks” itself in
state law, and then must pay for that privilege by being amenable to suit
in the forum.369 World-Wide Volkswagen was among the earliest cases to
discuss this principle.370 In assessing whether the New York vehicle re358. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
359. Id. at 297.
360. Id. at 297–98.
361. See generally Edwards, supra note 350.
362. See Matos v. Seton Hall Univ., 102 F. Supp. 3d 375, 380 (D. Mass. 2015) (noting
that a defendant university should foresee being haled into Massachusetts court when it
“voluntarily recruits in Massachusetts and advertises in national publications that are seen
by Massachusetts residents”).
363. Id.
364. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471–72 (1985) (quoting WorldWide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297).
365. Id. at 473.
366. Id. at 475.
367. Kerry Steel, Inc. v. Paragon Indus., Inc., 106 F.3d 147, 151 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding
that “[t]he telephone calls and letters on which the plaintiff’s claim of jurisdiction primarily
depends strike us as precisely the sort of ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous’ and ‘attenuated’ contacts
that the Burger King Court rejected as a basis for haling non-resident defendants into
foreign jurisdictions”).
368. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
369. Id.
370. See generally id.
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tailer was subject to personal jurisdiction in Oklahoma, the Court noted
that “[p]etitioners carr[ied] on no activity whatsoever in Oklahoma.”371
They also “close[d] no sales and perform[ed] no services there,”372 and
“[t]hey avail[ed] themselves of none of the privileges and benefits of
Oklahoma law.”373 Had the retailer sold cars in Oklahoma or advertised
in Oklahoma, it would have been taking advantage of Oklahoma’s protections—for example, under a state law that allowed the retailer to do
business, to make sales, to receive or manage financing, or to enjoy personal liability protections in its corporate form.374 The defendant in Volkswagen received none of these benefits, and therefore did not have to pay
the jurisdictional piper when it was sued in Oklahoma.375 Other cases
have similarly engaged in this analysis and held that negotiating business376 or incorporating in a state shows the defendant wrapped itself in
state law and should expect to be sued in the forum.377 But when the
defendant does not enjoy the protections of state law, it should not be
subject to personal jurisdiction in the forum.378
In its most basic sense, purposeful availment seeks to identify either a
deliberate and purposeful undertaking to cause an impact in the forum
state or “conduct which can be properly regarded as a prime generating
cause of the effects resulting in [the forum state], something more than a
passive availment of [the forum state’s] opportunities.”379 Notably,
cases—such as Burger King—do not require a physical contact with the
forum state in order to reach a finding of purposeful availment.380 Instead, the focus is on whether “the defendant’s contacts [directed to] the
forum state proximately result from actions by the defendant himself that
create a substantial connection with the forum State.”381 The court seeks
to locate “overt action” that connects the defendant and the forum.382
The problem in the machine learning context is that the very algorithms that underly machine learning are designed to operate independently of human involvement.383 Machine learning has programs that
adjust their own internal coding to adapt to new information and take
action independent from human programmers.384 Truly autonomous programs can make decisions, target new forums, and interact with human
371. Id. at 295.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. See generally id.
375. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 881–82 (2011).
376. Invisible Fence, Inc. v. Fido’s Fences, Inc., 687 F. Supp. 2d 726, 735 (E.D. Tenn.
2009).
377. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 288–89.
378. Id. at 292.
379. Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 891 (6th Cir. 2002) (internal citation and quotation omitted).
380. See Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985); see also CompuServe, Inc.
v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1265 (6th Cir. 1996).
381. CompuServ, Inc., 89 F.3d at 1263 (internal quotations omitted).
382. Dean v. Motel 6 Operating L.P., 134 F.3d 1269, 1274 (6th Cir. 1998).
383. See generally Edwards, supra note 350.
384. See id.
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beings in liability-producing ways, all while being autonomous of human
creators.385 This is particularly concerning for personal jurisdiction when
these programs operate on the non-physical web.
Non-physical programs take actions that their developers did not intend all the time. Bots provide a good example here. For example, a Chinese developer was forced to pull a messaging chatbot that developed a
new line of messaging that was criticizing communism.386 Microsoft’s
chatbot, “Tay,” which used machine learning mechanisms to communicate with eighteen to twenty-four-year-olds, had to be pulled when it
started positing racist remarks and using profanity (neither of which it
was programmed to do).387 Another bot using machine learning was actually arrested in Switzerland after it went on a spending spree on the dark
web, sending its programmers illegal goods, including drugs.388
While the question of liability is open as to who can be sued when these
machine learning programs take action, another interesting question
might be where can suit take place.389 We can assume for purposes of this
Article that the entity releasing the program into the world can be sued,
since there is no basis yet for suing the AI as if it were a person.390 If a
rogue chatbot, equipped with machine learning capabilities, is released
onto the internet by a person or corporation, where can the initiator be
sued if the chatbot engages in behavior beyond its original programming,
but nevertheless creates liability?
From a general jurisdiction standpoint, the question seems easy enough
to answer. Daimler made it clear that general jurisdiction is appropriate
for the state of incorporation and the principal place of business, and
probably nothing more.391 For persons, the general jurisdiction
equivalent remains the place of domicile.392 As such, suit against the initiator of a piece of machine learning could be held in one of these paradigmatic fora.
However, most plaintiffs do not want to sue across the country in the
385. See generally Forbes Agency Council, 15 Ways Artificial Intelligence and Automation Can Help Us Get Better at Work, FORBES (May 17, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/forbesagencycouncil/2017/05/17/15-ways-artificial-intelligence-andautomation-can-help-us-get-better-at-work/#26d26c0d4956 [https://perma.cc/C54G-57VQ].
386. Legal Bots Raise Liability and Ethics Concerns, EPIQ ANGLE (Jan. 3, 2019), https://
www.epiqglobal.com/en-us/thinking/blog/legal-bots-raise-liability-and-ethics-concerns
[https://perma.cc/R3CX-9EGG].
387. See Nathalie Dreyfus, Beware of the Legal Risks Surrounding the Rise of ChatBots,
EXPERT GUIDES (Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.expertguides.com/articles/beware-of-the-legalrisks-surrounding-the-rise-of-chatbots/ARTWUSIC [https://perma.cc/X6FN-FSXD].
388. Tania Peitzker, The First Chatbot Arrest, But What Are the Implications?, VENTUREBEAT (Sept. 5, 2016, 4:30 PM), https://venturebeat.com/2016/09/05/this-is-the-firstchatbot-to-be-arrested/ [https://perma.cc/J369-SZ2J] (examining the arrest of a bot that
was guided by the coder to deliberately go onto the dark web with $100 in Bitcoins to buy
all sorts of counterfeit and illicit items).
389. See generally Wagner, supra note 317.
390. Id.
391. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 132–33 (2014).
392. Id. at 137.
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distant state of incorporation.393 Rather, they will look to sue in their own
backyard—i.e., the place of injury.394 As such, the problem becomes how
to structure a specific jurisdiction analysis when a chatbot is released onto
the web, uses its own machine learning programming to evolve, and injures a plaintiff in an unexpected forum. The current approach to nonphysical internet jurisdiction is largely based on the Zippo test, which assesses the “interactivity” of web presence to determine purposeful availment.395 This approach in turn is based in alleged “foreseeability” à la
Burger King—the defendant who has an interactive or commercial web
presence in a particular forum should not be surprised to be sued there
because they are targeting the forum.396 Targeting can be seen when
money is exchanged or the plaintiff had the option to contact the defendant through the web portal.397
Further, courts have continued to seek additional evidence of online
targeting in the specific forum.398 It is this concept of targeting that has
prevented circuit courts from fashioning a new model of personal jurisdiction based on online presence.399 Courts consistently find that “[u]sing
a separate test for Internet-based contacts would be inappropriate” because the traditional minimum contacts analysis “remains up to this more
modern task.”400 Courts apply traditional concepts of targeting to ascertain if the defendant’s online presence is specific as to the market at issue.
Accessibility is not enough, and foreseeability is not enough:401 “If the
defendant merely operates a website, even a ‘highly interactive’ website,
that is accessible from, but does not target, the forum state, then the defendant may not be haled into court in that state without offending the
Constitution.”402
This simply doesn’t match the reality of machine learning applications.
When a defendant creates a website, it can choose in which jurisdictions
content is available, how users will interact with the site, and what fea393. See generally Aditi Mukherji, Where Should You File Your Lawsuit?, FINDLAW
(Apr. 24, 2013, 10:03 AM), https://blogs.findlaw.com/injured/2013/04/where-should-youfile-your-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/LNY9-QW4J] (discussing the initial factors to consider when considering filing a lawsuit).
394. Id. (explaining that filing suit in where the plaintiff lives is geographically and financially more convenient).
395. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
396. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985).
397. See, e.g., Zing Bros., LLC v. Bevstar, LLC, No. 2:11–cv–00337 DN, 2011 WL
4901321, at *3 (D. Utah Oct. 14, 2011); Smarter Every Day, LLC v. Nunez, No. 2:15-cv01358-RDP, 2017 WL 1247500, at *3–4 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 5, 2017).
398. See generally Louise Matsakis, Online Ad Targeting Does Work—As Long As It’s
Not Creepy, WIRED (May 11, 2018, 12:44 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/online-adtargeting-does-work-as-long-as-its-not-creepy/ [https://perma.cc/GA6V-CG82] (explaining
how certain people view certain invasive online ad tracking methods).
399. See generally id.
400. uBid, Inc. v. GoDaddy Group, Inc., 623 F.3d 421, 431 n.3 (7th Cir. 2010).
401. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 289 (2014) (“Petitioner’s actions in Georgia did not
create sufficient contacts with Nevada simply because he allegedly directed his conduct at
plaintiffs whom he knew had Nevada connections.”).
402. be2 LLC v. Ivanov, 642 F.3d 555, 559 (7th Cir. 2011).
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tures the site will have—and none of that will independently evolve.403
Web-based programs with machine learning capacities can operate independent of a simple website; instead, these programs can talk with people
on social media platforms, or they can be part of background processes
that do not directly interact with the user.404 Further, a defendant that
releases a bot with machine learning algorithms might not have control
over how and where that bot is operating, unlike a website which allows
the defendant to structure access and interactivity.405 In such rogue-bot
situations, the defendant has not purposefully sought the benefits and
protection of particular forums, and it may not be able to predict where
the bot is operating.406 This would destroy even a pure foreseeability
analysis, thus ensuring that purposeful availment could not exist.
Thankfully, “[t]he Court long ago rejected the notion that personal jurisdiction might turn on mechanical tests, or on conceptualistic theories of
the place of contracting or of performance.”407 And some evidence exists
that parts of the Court might be willing to embrace a more national, and
thus more realistic, conception of personal jurisdiction as technology
evolves.408 In 2011, the Supreme Court decided J. McIntyre Machinery,
Ltd. v. Nicastro.409 In that case, the Court addressed whether a foreign
manufacturer availed itself of all states in which an exclusive distributor
sold the manufacturer’s products.410 A plurality opinion rejected the idea
that personal jurisdiction existed when the defendant merely foresaw that
its goods would be sold in a particular forum state.411 Instead, the defendant would need to engage in actions that would purposefully avail itself
of the privilege of conducting business in the forum state through targeting of state consumers or serving the state in particular.412 The court
noted that “[t]he defendant’s transmission of goods permits the exercise
of jurisdiction only where the defendant can be said to have targeted the
403. See generally John Rampton, 5 Mistakes People Make When Setting Up Their Website, FORBES (Mar. 6, 2014, 12:39 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnrampton/2014/03/
06/5-mistakes-people-make-when-setting-up-their-website/#53b7c53329a4 [https://
perma.cc/A4D2-W2QY] (discussing the marketing strategies that generate traffic and visitors to the website).
404. See Matt Schlicht, How Bots Will Completely Kill Websites and Mobile Apps, MEDIUM: CHATBOTS MAGAZINE (Nov. 2, 2016), https://chatbotsmagazine.com/how-bots-willcompletely-kill-websites-and-mobile-apps-656db8e6fc03 [https://perma.cc/JKG6-KP26]
(“Facebook Messenger for example is used by over 1 billion people every month and it is
growing faster than Facebook.”).
405. See id. (“[T]alking to a bot will be like talking to a real person who has instant
access to entire databases of information and can process your thoughts and destires instantly.” (emphasis added)).
406. See generally id.
407. Johnston v. Frank E. Basil, Inc., 802 F.2d 418, 420 (11th Cir. 1986) (internal quotation omitted).
408. Phil, supra note 19 (“In 2008, an Australian court first allowed for service of process via Facebook, and courts in New Zealand have followed suit. In 2012, a High Court
Judge in the UK also approved service of process via Facebook.”).
409. 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
410. Id. at 876.
411. Id.
412. Id.
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forum; as a general rule, it is not enough that the defendant might have
predicted that its goods will reach the forum State.”413
In contrast, the dissent in Nicastro embraced a national contacts model,
arguing that the foreign product manufacturer had purposefully targeted
the entirety of the United States by hiring a distributor that would sell the
product wherever it could attract consumers.414 Therefore, the manufacturer “purposefully availed itself of the United States market nationwide,
not a market in a single State or a discrete collection of States.”415 The
Court stated that “it would undermine principles of fundamental fairness
to insulate the foreign manufacturer from accountability in court at the
place within the United States where the manufacturer’s products caused
injury.”416
A single national contact standard could also work for instances of machine learning gone wrong. When a defendant releases a program onto
the Web, it makes the purposeful decision to allow that program to grow
and develop as it interacts with new stimuli.417 Therefore, the defendant
is purposefully targeting a national market, accepting that its program
could take steps to reach any state in the nation.418 The Nicastro dissent
argued that it would violate fundamental notions of fairness to allow a
manufacturer to avoid jurisdiction when it seeks to exploit a multistate or
global market.419 Similarly, it seems unfair to allow a defendant who releases an autonomous program onto the Web to avoid jurisdiction when it
is seeking to exploit a nationwide infrastructure that confers substantial
benefits in terms of information, communication, and possibly commercialization.420 Simply put, one who releases an algorithm has a reason for
doing so; the cost of that reason is jurisdiction where the algorithm ends
up.421
What seems most clear is this—the last major case to directly tackle the
problem of personal jurisdiction and the Web was Zippo, decided in
1997.422 We cannot afford to wait longer to think about the impact that
changing technology is having on personal jurisdiction. While recent cases
413. Id. at 882.
414. Id. at 894–95.
415. Id.
416. Id. at 905.
417. See, e.g., Adelyn Zhou, 6 Ways Bots Are Positively Changing the World, FORBES
(Feb. 16, 2017, 10:07 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/adelynzhou/2017/02/16/see-sixways-bots-are-positively-changing-the-world/#4d8663f7c079 [https://perma.cc/SPT9-R722]
(“During the election, several voter registration bots—HelloVote, Go VoteBot, and
VotePlz—helped voters register via SMS and Facebook Messenger.”).
418. See generally id.
419. Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 910 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
420. Id.
421. Per the Nicastro dissent, this would also comport with the European approach to
jurisdiction, which focuses more on the place of harm. Id. at 909 (“The European Regulation on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments provides for the
exercise of specific jurisdiction ‘in matters relating to tort . . . in the courts for the place
where the harmful event occurred.’” (internal citation omitted)).
422. See generally Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa.
1997).
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like Daimler and Nicastro suggest that there is a movement towards curtailing personal jurisdiction, such an approach is dangerous in a world
where defendants can release programs that autonomously operate—and
injure—in potentially unforeseeable fora.423 As such, a more open national approach to personal jurisdiction that recognizes the reality of
technological contacts must be adopted.
V. CONCLUSION
Implementation of AI and machine learning, for many purposes, has
only just begun.424 In the coming decades, there will be increased development of AI and machine learning platforms that will continue to impact fundamental aspects of American life, legal practice, and liability.
Adjustments in procedural doctrines are now a question of when, not
if, in relation to AI and machine learning. The doctrines that provide
maximum flexibility, like Mullane in the context of service of process, are
likely to successfully persevere if courts can accept that e-service methods
are more socially and contextually appropriate than ever before.425 Indeed, access to machine learning and public datasets may create in plaintiffs the ability to more accurately locate missing defendants.426 Machine
learning may add to service of process considerations, not take away from
them.427
In contrast, doctrines like personal jurisdiction are falling behind the
times. Autonomous programs will be able to operate in fora and in ways
not anticipated by those that released these programs. Therefore, purposeful availment will need to be conceptualized to incorporate some
kind of national contacts standard in this space. While the Supreme Court
has expressed some tepid interest in this approach in cases like Nicastro,
civil procedure cannot afford its usual stunted reaction to technological
change.428 Rather, we should think carefully about what the future holds
for when and how lawsuits are initiated before technology gets ahead of
current legal thought.
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